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THE FREEDOM OF THE GOOD:
A STUDY OF PLATO‟S ETHICAL CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM
by
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ABSTRACT
My dissertation argues that Plato has a concept of individual metaphysical freedom,
making him a key figure in the emergence of the free will debate in the history of Western
philosophy. A philosophy of freedom can be seen throughout his works, particularly in the
Republic, the Laws, and the Phaedrus. I show that underlying Platonic moral psychology is the
notion that an individual is free if her reasoning element rules her soul in line with the Good. This
makes Platonic freedom a thoroughly ethical concept.
In my first chapter, I examine Plato‘s critique of three competing notions of
freedom drawn from conventional notions of virtue, democracy, and tyranny. Plato‘s own
notion of freedom emerges from his criticisms of these alternative definitions of freedom.
He redefines freedom from a conception of unconstrained choice towards a notion of
reasoned choice in line with virtue. Thus, Platonic freedom is a normative concept.
My next chapter provides a detailed analysis of Platonic freedom by examining its
metaphysical foundation as described in the Republic. This work reveals the philosopher
as the authentically free person. The myth of Er engages notions of freedom,
responsibility and choice. In this myth, Plato emphasizes individual responsibility even in
cases of diminished psychological freedom. The myth of the Cave underscores the idea

vi
that philosophical freedom is not liberty to pursue desires uninhibited. Rather, freedom is
the ability to pursue reason‘s desires as informed by the Good.
My final chapter examines the concept of freedom within the tripartite
psychology. The Phaedrus myth provides further detail about the interaction between the
parts of the soul and the struggle for freedom. It emphasizes the natural position of reason
as ruler of the soul. The image of the golden cord in the Laws outlines the soul‘s ideal
relationship to reason. The freedom of the philosopher is moderate, self-controlled, and
predictable.
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1. Introduction
The question of whether and how human beings have free will is an enduring
philosophical question. It is often argued that the problem was first articulated after Plato,
in the Hellenistic period.1 I wish to challenge this view by showing that Plato is a pivotal
figure in the emergence of the philosophical debate about free will. I shall argue that
Plato‘s dialogues make strong assertions about human agency and moral responsibility
within a teleological cosmology.
The special contribution of this dissertation lies in its focus upon the problem of
free will in the mythical sections of Plato‘s text. This approach has several advantages.
The mythical backdrop allows Plato to explore the problem freely through the thought
experiments and extrapolations that myth allows. The perspective of the afterlife, in
particular, enables Plato to represent a human course of life as a single unit of
accumulated choices of actions, while at the same time focusing on the importance of
present choices. In doing so, he develops a concept of freedom by connecting key aspects
of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Since Plato is such a seminal figure in the
history of philosophy it is important to try to get him right so that his works may better
understood, along with the philosophical developments that follow him. This study
uncovers nuances that can be brought to bear even in the contemporary debate. Thus, a
historically sensitive discussion of freedom and determinism in Plato‘s works is
warranted and desirable.

1

See, for example, Huby 1967 and Bobzien 1998. Huby argues that Epicurus was the first philosopher to
discover the free will problem, while Bobzien pinpoints its articulation in the second century A.D.
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a. The Historical Freedom and Determinism Debate
Plato builds upon a nascent concept of metaphysical freedom present in some
early Greek poets and tragedians, who approach the topic of freedom and fatalism
through their particular genres. These authors begin to draw out a more individualized
concept of personal freedom in tension with the religio-poetic concepts of fate. Fate
(moira) is broached in the works of Homer, Pindar, Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles;
however, it is difficult to extract a rigorous philosophical position from these nonphilosophical sources.2
A crude form of determinism seems to have emerged with the Atomists,
Leucippus and Democritus, who were contemporaries, and apparently nemeses, of Plato. 3
The Atomists theorized that processes in the universe are a result of the interactions
between different types of atoms. 4 The atomists seem to allow some room for freedom,
as they recommended mastering pleasure 5 and suggested that teaching reshapes the
character of a person.6
In addition, around the time of Plato‘s birth a debate was emerging in the public
arena regarding nomos (custom, law, convention) and physis (nature, natural order).7
Within this debate the rudimentary concepts of necessity and freedom to resist nature
2

Greene 1963 provides a good survey of the Greek concept of fate. For a discussion of freedom and fate in
tragedy see Patterson 1991, 109-132; 165-173.
3
Plato never mentions Democritus by name, though his opposition to materialism in the Theaetetus is often
thought to be aimed at the Atomists. Surprisingly, however, Plato may have used some of Democritus‘
cosmogony as inspiration for his Timaeus.
4
The atomists do seem to allow some room for freedom. They recommended mastering pleasure
(Democritus, DK 68B214) and suggested that teaching reshapes the nature of a person (Democritus, DK
68B33). In fact, this causal determinism may be part of a compatibilist scheme overall.
5
Democritus, DK 68B214.
6
Democritus, DK 68B33.
7
For more on the historical background of this debate see McKirahan 1994, 390-413.
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come to the fore. Plato enters this debate with his theory of the nomos of ideal society in
the Republic and his Laws. Physis is also championed by Thrasymachus in the Republic
and Callicles in the Gorgias. A theme of the dialogues is the naturalness of the order of
reason in the cosmos and the individual.
The nomos-physis debate emerges when a concept of political freedom appears in
classical Athenian society. The advent of democracy coincided with the invention of a
concept of political freedom, which entailed liberty from tyranny as well as the ability to
engage in political decisions. Plato is the first philosopher to engage extensively with
these new ideas of political and metaphysical freedom. He attacks democratic and
tyrannical concepts of freedom. At the same time he confronts traditional beliefs about
fatalism through his eschatological myths.
After Plato the debate starts to take on more explicit shape starting with Aristotle.8
It takes a decisively new turn when the Epicureans9 and Stoics10 introduce a version of
hard determinism. With the work of Chrysippus, in particular, the debate enters a phase
that sounds surprisingly modern. The debate is further expanded by the Middle Platonists
through to early Christianity. 11 Nonetheless, I argue Plato provides the first serious
attempt to introduce and resolve the debate about individual metaphysical freedom in the
Western philosophical tradition.
In contemporary philosophy, there are three main positions on the free will
8

Aristotle argues for a category of prohairesis distinct from the Platonic categories of epithumia, thumos,
boulēsis and doxa. See Pakaluk 2005, 130. In his Nichomachean Ethics III.1, he finds voluntariness to be
key in attributing praise or blame. Aristotle also broaches the subject of determinism in his famous Sea
Battle Example where he raises the problem of the necessity and truth values of present statements
regarding future events, De Interpretatione IX.
9
Huby 1967.
10
See Bobzien 1998.
11
Aquinas gives an elaborate account of types of willings in his development of Aristotelian compatibilism,
particularly in Summa Theologica, Part One.
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question: determinism, libertarianism and the synthesis of the two, compatibilism, also
called soft determinism. The first two positions are versions of incompatibilism, meaning
that they find determinism and freedom of the will to be incompatible with each other.
Most versions of the above positions posit claims about whether rational agents can will
actions freely, that is without constraint. 12 Willing is thus distinguished from acting on
one‘s will because factors external to one‘s will may impede the full completion of the
desired action. Plato is likewise focused on choice (prohairesis), rather than on action.
Philosophers who hold the position that humans have free will come in many
varieties. A version of this doctrine pertinent to Plato is the libertarian agent-causation
theory, which distinguishes agent causation from the event causation of causal
determinism. 13 In this version agents cause events, as unmoved movers, and desires may
incline agents towards certain actions, but do not necessitate them. An important concern
of many free will proponents is the ‗could have done otherwise‘ clause, which states that
a person is free if she could have acted otherwise than she did. For instance, just now I
continued working. However, I just as well could have gotten a drink of water, checked
my email, or done a variety of other actions. According to the libertarian, I could have
done otherwise than working, the action I chose. If I turned back the clock to that exact
same point in time with the same conditions, I was free to choose another action. Nothing
in the past or in my mind determined that I must continue working. 14

12

In contrast, some philosophers define freedom as action, not choice of action or willing action, without
constraint. Descartes most notably holds this, in Meditation IV.
13
This version is championed by Chisholm 1997, 143-155.
14
Libertarianism works best, in my opinion, when accompanied by a theory of the soul, which can account
for the non-materialistic basis of actions. Otherwise, it becomes difficult to make libertarianism compatible
with scientific evidence that human choices produce physical events in the brain and that physical events in
the rest of the body appear to be governed by physical, deterministic laws. However, libertarianism and

5
The determinist claims that persons are not free in willing any actions due to
causal, biological, psychological, or theological necessity. Each of these types of
determinism is relevant to Plato‘s analysis. Causal determinism holds that a complete
description of the way things are at one time uniquely determines all subsequent states of
affairs, according to natural laws. Biological determinism is the view that biology fully
determines destiny. A strand of this view can be seen in Plato‘s breeding program for the
ruling class (Republic 459d-e). According to psychological determinism, purposes, needs,
and desires of individuals can explain human behavior. 15 For Plato, as I will show,
overcoming one‘s base desires and empowering reason to rule one‘s actions is the only
true freedom. Theological determinism is the thesis that if God knows the future, then all
future events are predetermined and thus we are not free. 16 This final form of
determinism is applicable particularly to Plato‘s Laws, where it is stated ―you exist for
the sake of the universe‖ (903c) .17 Here it is implied that each soul has a cosmic
purpose, which may be a form of theological determinism. The Timaeus also contains
elements of this type of determinism. For instance, the production of human souls is said
to complete the universe (41b-c).
It is important to note that if determinism is true, nothing would change
phenomenologically. Individuals may not feel compelled to act in a certain way; rather
they would deliberate and feel as if they were free, according to their customs and beliefs.

dualism do not always go hand in hand with philosophers. For instance, Peter Van Inwagen is a libertarian
materialist. However, his strong theism and his commitment to continuation of life after death work to
mitigate the tensions in this pairing by still allowing for a transcendent aspect in his framework.
15
B. F. Skinner‘s behavioral determinism is an example of this view.
16
Another version of this theological determinism is divine preordination: the doctrine that if God is the
ultimate cause of everything, God has preordained everything that will occur, and therefore everything is
determined. This ends up being a form of causal determinism.
17
Unless otherwise indicated, all Plato quotations are from Plato 1997 (varying translators).

6
Determinism broadly construed is simply a metaphysical explanation of the world, with
no phenomenological evidence on which to base its truth. Likewise, determinism should
be distinguished from fatalism, the doctrine that certain events are fated to occur, no
matter which preconditions exist. The classic Greek example of fatalism is the story of
Oedipus, who was fated to kill his father and marry his mother no matter what
precautions he or his parents took to prevent the predicted events.
There are deterministic elements in Plato‘s works. However, in his eschatology
Plato emphasizes that the choice of one‘s next life is the soul‘s responsibility, not the
god‘s. Thus, because of Plato‘s focus on free choice here he appears anti-deterministic. In
tension with this Plato insists that the soul‘s experiences both in life and in the afterlife,
particularly of punishment and reward, do seem to impact the souls‘ choices in a
deterministic way. It remains to be seen whether the choices that caused certain afterlife
results are free or not. A solution may be found in placing Plato with the compatibilists.
Compatibilists claim to solve the free will problem by arguing that determinism
and free will—and often moral responsibility—are compatible. Traditional or classical
compatibilism holds that one is free when able to act without constraint according to
one‘s desires. Free actions are still caused actions, making freedom and determinism
compatible. This position, more or less, was held by many modern philosophers such as
Thomas Hobbes, David Hume and John Stuart Mill.

7
b. Freedom and Platonic Myth
Why examine the topic of freedom and determinism in Platonic myth? It is in the
eschatological myths that Plato addresses moral responsibility and punishment, two key
aspects of the freedom and determinism debate, more acutely and compactly than
elsewhere in his dialogues. The main issues of how the past is connected to the future and
the impact of this relationship upon our decision-making come to a head in Plato‘s
afterlife scheme of punishment, reward and subsequent transmigration of souls into
different bodies. The question of whether determinism is compatible with moral
responsibility, and thus punishment, often plays a large factor in philosophers‘
acceptance of determinism. 18 As with many afterlife schemes, the consequences of one‘s
actions throughout life are experienced more intensely in Plato‘s Hades. It is here that
Plato shows the reader the full brunt of philosophical and non-philosophical ways of life.
In these myths Plato is best able to underscore the importance of the philosophical life.
Further, because of Plato‘s inclusion of transmigration in his system, we see these
positive effects of philosophy being carried over into other lives and influencing the
choice of the next life. Will is shown to play a heightened role in Plato‘s afterlife, making
the myths a good place to frame a study of freedom and determinism in Plato. Finally,
mythical sections are always conjoined with passages of non-mythical reasoning.19
Hence, I will be able to bring in non-mythical portions of text to compare and add to what
is being said in the myths.

18

Frankfurt 1997, 155-166 argues that free will is not a necessary precondition for moral responsibility, and
has tried to pry apart these two notions.
19
Nicholson 1999, 33.
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Quite a detailed eschatology can be pieced together by comparing all of Plato‘s
myths of the afterlife and using the elements in one myth to fill in elements that are
missing or glossed over in others. Of course each of Plato‘s works has a somewhat
different emphasis, which then carries over into the corresponding myth in that particular
work. However, overall this method gives a consistent eschatology. A fairly complete
eschatology can be pieced together based upon the Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic,
Laws, and Timaeus. In approaching the myths this way, I am taking an interpretive stance
with regard to the question of the continuity of the dialogues in suggesting that one
eschatology can be found throughout Plato‘s works. 20
When these myths and their eschatological themes are considered synoptically,
one finds a curious mixture of elements of freedom, necessity, order, chance and fate
experienced by the souls in the afterlife. My dissertation will aim to determine what Plato
is trying to do by including all of these, sometimes seemingly contradictory, elements in
his eschatology.
c. Previous Scholarship on Plato and Free Will
Most frequently, the topic of freedom in Plato has been broached peripherally, as
an aside to a different set of concerns or interpretive studies on a single Platonic work. 21
One reason for this may be that the topic of freedom, like many special topics in Plato,
touches multiple areas of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Another reason for this
is the assumption, mentioned above that freedom is a topic that arose later in the history
20

I am following Long 1948 and Döring 1893 on this point. However, I do allow that Plato may have
changed his mind, or perhaps simply his emphasis, on a number of philosophical issues throughout his
writing career. In addition, I also maintain that each dialogue can be read independently of the others with
fruitful results.
21
See, for instance, Bobonich 2002, 521n133.
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of philosophy. Further, when freedom is discussed, the focus has been largely on political
freedom.22 Such study has its place, but it is my contention that Plato‘s treatment of
political freedom is related to a doctrine of individual metaphysical freedom. 23
Kenneth Dorter calls the myth of Er ―the first formulation of the problem of free
will,‖24 a milestone in the history of Western philosophy, if true. Dorter‘s article
introduces a problem with Plato‘s eschatological schema: ―Our choice of life entails the
choice of a particular character . . . but any choice we make is already determined by our
present character, so if we choose our character we must do so on the basis of the
character we already have, and there seems to be an infinite regress.‖ 25 In such a system,
individual souls are never truly free to deviate from inclinations accumulated in past
lives. How can there be any hope for change if one‘s path is predetermined by choices
made in the afterlife and previous lives? Further, to be able to impute moral
responsibility, we must be responsible for our character if our character compels our
actions. A closer examination of the myths indicates that there are some exceptions to
this prima facie ―depressing‖26 eschatological scheme.
Two ways out of the cosmic machinery are either to break bad habits through
afterlife punishment and suffering or to maintain habits so strong that they withstand any
superficial desires that come from undergoing afterlife suffering or rewards. 27 A third
option is to determine one‘s choices using wisdom, not habit or reaction to reward or
22

The most famous critic of Plato as an enemy to the freedom of the ‗open society‘ is of course Popper
1966.
23
Indeed, the primary focus of the political sections of the Republic might best be taken as metaphor in
relation to the individual soul, following Annas 1999, 82-83, Waterfield 1993, xiv, xvi, and Williams 1993,
154.
24
Dorter 2003, 132.
25
Dorter 2003, 131.
26
Annas 1982, 132.
27
Dorter 2003, 136.
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punishment.28 The third option allows philosophers true freedom. Dorter concludes that
Plato is a compatibilist because he believes in rational choice and causal determinism:
―Our empirical selves are not free from the law of cause and effect, but our truest self,
reason, is free from the domination of the irrational, and from the unconscious
domination of habit and manipulation.‖ 29
On the other hand, Dorter highlights places in the myth that show intertwinement
of individual destinies and the destiny of the cosmos as a whole. He suggests that Plato is
hinting that the necessity in individual lives plays ―a necessary part in the harmonious
fabric of the whole.‖30 Dorter relates this to the Pythagorean idea of the harmony of the
spheres. Unfortunately, after a cursory comparison to the Timaeus, Dorter does not return
to this theme or incorporate it into his conclusion. Further work on this idea could yield
interesting results for the discussion of freedom and determinism in Plato. On the whole,
Dorter makes some promising entrées in his paper. However, I see this article as
prefatory to more in-depth study of the topic.
In contrast to Dorter, Julia Annas seems to fall prey to anachronism and lack of
charity when interpreting Plato‘s eschatology. Famously, she refers to the myth of Er as a
―lame and messy ending‖ to the Republic and a ―painful shock.‖31 Further, she calls the
reincarnation scheme in it ―implausible, and even grotesque.‖32 Annas is troubled by the
impersonal cosmic machinery that ―contains no optimistic promise of final reward to
induce us to be just.‖33 However, here she seems to miss two important points brought
28

Dorter 2003, 136-137.
Dorter 2003, 138.
30
Dorter 2003, 135.
31
Annas 1981, 353, 349.
32
Annas 1982, 138.
33
Annas 1982, 139.
29
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out by Dorter. Firstly, the myth of Er is referring to ―most‖ people or souls. 34 As
mentioned above, philosophers can escape the deterministic scheme. A second
counterpoint to Annas‘ interpretation is that justice does not guarantee absolute happiness
or reward, only relative happiness as compared to the unjust.35
Because of her unwillingness to accept that Plato may have believed in
reincarnation36 she proceeds, as she puts it, to ‗demythologize‘ the myth. She is bothered
by the ‗fatalism‘ that the cosmic system suggests and instead seizes upon the points
where personal responsibility and present choices are highlighted to produce what may be
called an allegorical interpretation of the myth whereby the afterlife details are taken as
metaphors for making choices in life and their consequences. While I agree that this is
one plausible meaning to be taken from the myth of Er, I think that Annas is too eager to
discount the possibility that Plato did believe some of the ―apparatus of reincarnation.‖
The fact that the same apparatus continues to appear in Plato‘s other eschatological
myths, each time with details complementing the other myths and the constant presence
of Orphic-Pythagorean imagery in his works indicates that Plato did study and find more
than simple dramatic value in the eschatological scheme that he presents. The accounts of
Plato‘s meetings with the Pythagoreans in Sicily also bear this out.37
Moreover, Annas claims that if the myth of Er is taken seriously, ―it seems to
offer us an entirely consequentialist reason for being just, thus undermining Plato‘s
sustained effort to show that justice is worth having for the agent in a non-

34

Dorter 2003, 136.
Dorter 2003, 138-140.
36
―Plato is not seriously suggesting that we have lived other lives and been through their consequences in
heaven and hell‖ (Annas 1981, 351).
37
Plato writes about going to Sicily in his Seventh Letter.
35
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consequentialist way.‖38 With respect to Annas‘ objection it is important to remember
that in Book 2 of the Republic (357d-358a) Socrates places justice in the highest class of
goods, things both valuable in themselves and because of their consequences. More
important, however, is the fact that although Plato is presenting the afterlife consequences
of various ways of living he is steering his readers away from this focus by suggesting
that those who have steeled themselves against valuing pleasure and absence of pain,
focusing on philosophy instead, will weather the inevitable ups and downs of various
lives. Thus, the thrust of the myth is that by valuing philosophy for itself one will not be
swayed into choosing lives based on pleasures and rewards to be received. A true
philosopher is not focused on avoiding suffering and being rewarded; rather, he comes
into a state where he is beyond pleasure and pain because these things are not his focus.
For the non-philosophical person, the myth can be seen as a consequentialist depiction of
justice, but the true philosopher sees the non-consequentialist underpinning of what is
said and left unsaid by Plato in the form of Er. My study aims to refute Annas‘ objection
about the myth of Er by expanding upon the argument just stated.
R. F. Stalley takes a similar view to Dorter‘s, in arguing that a main message of
the Republic is that the just man—that is, the philosopher—is truly free and that injustice
is a kind of inner slavery. 39 Stalley claims that the philosopher ―is free, not because he
has some faculty of free choice, but because his decisions are a response to a true vision
of the good.‖40 Stalley also notes that Plato does not see freedom as a necessary

38

Annas 1981, 349. This objection could also be leveled against the Phaedo and the Gorgias.
Stalley 1998, 145, 147.
40
Stalley 1998, 151.
39
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condition for responsibility in the sense of inflicting punishment for wrongdoing. 41 In
addition, punishment may serve as a cure to the offender. 42 Stalley makes some
important remarks about citizens‘ freedom in the Laws and Republic as being defined by
governance by persuasion rather than force.43 This discussion can be applied to Plato‘s
use of myth as a form of persuading the citizenry in the Republic. As I also indicated, in
the Timaeus persuasion seems to be able to dismantle determinism on the cosmic scale
and now perhaps on the human scale too. This idea makes for a unique approach to the
freedom and determinism debate.
Stalley asserts that freedom is not an all-or-nothing matter for Plato; instead, ―The
more we willingly allow our lives to be governed by reason the more free we are.‖44
Thus, one‘s freedom can be placed on a continuum. Further, Stalley remarks that freedom
is a matter of knowledge, not of choice. These conclusions suggest that more
straightforward compatibilism may not accurately describe Plato‘s position. Stalley‘s
investigation into Plato‘s doctrine of freedom does not examine the eschatological myths
at all, even though he is dealing exclusively with texts that contain these myths.
d. Outline of my Study
In chapter two, I examine Plato‘s criticisms of three competing notions of
freedom. The first conception of freedom is that of conventional virtue, whereby one is
thought to be free if one follows social mores. However, conventional virtue provides an
ethical framework without understanding. The second notion of freedom is democratic
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freedom, which is the ability to purse desires without constraint. For Plato, this definition
of freedom lacks the ethical direction of the Good. Finally, tyranny—the absolute ability
to do as one pleases—encourages the overdevelopment of the lower parts of the soul at
the expense of reason. Plato‘s own notion of freedom emerges from his criticisms of
these alternative definitions of freedom. He redefines freedom, rejecting the conception
of unconstrained choice and embracing the reasoned choice in accordance with virtue.
Hence, Plato transforms freedom into a thoroughly ethical concept. In this revised
concept of freedom one is free when pursuing the desires of the highest part of the soul,
so that the reasoning part‘s natural desires drive the soul‘s actions. Plato sees these as the
true desires of the soul, but also as the appropriate desires one should have. Thus,
Platonic freedom is a normative concept.
The ethical aspect of Platonic freedom is discussed in chapter three on the myth of
Er in the Republic. The myth explores notions of freedom, responsibility and choice.
Here Plato emphasizes individual responsibility even in cases of diminished
psychological capacity. We see this in the poor choices that most souls make in the
afterlife. Only Odysseus makes a wise choice by relying on reason and past experience
instead of lower desires. The outlines of lives are chosen before birth. However, Plato
still makes the case that souls‘ reactions to prenatally-chosen events are free and open to
revision. In this chapter, I suggest that the lower parts of the soul survive physical death,
but that philosophers ultimately achieve permanent liberation from the lower soul after an
unspecified number of incarnations.
Chapter four examines the role of freedom within Plato‘s tripartite psychology.
Freedom is shown consistently to involve the rule of reason in the soul. The first section
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of this chapter provides a detailed analysis of Platonic freedom by examining its
metaphysical foundation as described in the Republic. Plato‘s metaphysical system
presents the philosopher as the authentically free person. He highlights the Form of the
Good, and emphasizes knowledge of the Forms more generally, as the ideals which
should inform free actions. The allegory compares knowing the Forms to freedom from
the enslavement of imagination and belief. At the same time, this freedom entails an
absolute allegiance to the Forms and necessitates action to instantiate them in the
physical world. The myth of the Cave underscores the idea that philosophical freedom is
not liberty to pursue desires uninhibited. Rather, freedom is the ability to pursue reason‘s
desires as informed by the Good.
The second section of chapter four looks at two other myths in the Platonic corpus
that pertain to freedom. The Phaedrus myth provides further detail about the interaction
between the parts of the soul. It emphasizes the natural position of reason as ruler of the
soul. The image of the golden cord in the Laws outlines the soul‘s ideal relationship to
reason. Action in line with reason puts an individual in the most control over her life,
allowing her to be free. The divinity of reason links the philosopher to the gods, so that
she is working to instantiate the Good. The alternative is enslavement to desires and
pathological emotions, which will lead to erratic and unpredictable action.
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2. Varieties of False Freedom
a. Freedom Understood Through Conventional Notions of Virtue
Is the just life worth living? This is the main question that Plato asks in the
Republic. The early books of the Republic frame the question in these terms: does justice
impede individual freedom to pursue the desires that many think lead to happiness? I
will show that the definitions of justice put forward by the interlocutors contain
concomitant conceptions of freedom.45 Plato demonstrates that misguided notions of
justice are associated with equally deficient conceptions of freedom. He juxtaposes
several political and ethical versions of justice within the Republic. In this chapter, I will
focus on three main ideas of justice: the justice of traditional morality, the justice of
democratic equality, and the tyrant‘s justice.46 Each of these three concepts of justice
corresponds to a distinct conception of freedom. And Plato challenges all three. Plato‘s
assessments of each concept of freedom reveal aspects of his own as well as the
challenges it must face.
i.

The Freedom of Conventional Virtue

The first conception of freedom is represented by Cephalus, 47 where freedom is
the ability to pursue one‘s desires within the limits of traditional morality. I will call this
conventional freedom. Although Cephalus is only present in the first book of the
45
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Republic, he introduces three considerations into the discussion of justice that are
important for Socrates‘ own theories of justice and freedom. First, Cephalus maintains
that the restraint of appetites produces psychological freedom. Second, he exhibits
concern for others‘ well-being. Finally, he highlights the importance of knowledge.
ii.

Restraint of Appetite

Cephalus suggests that the pursuit of all of one‘s desires may lead to enslavement
rather than freedom. Sophocles‘ answer to the question of whether he was still able to
enjoy sex in his old age, strikes Cephalus as apt: ―I am very glad to have escaped from all
that, like a slave who has escaped from a savage and tyrannical master‖ (329c2-3). Thus,
Cephalus describes the appetite for sex as a tyrannical force opposing freedom. 48 Indeed,
Cephalus is the first to mention freedom by name in the Republic when he adds,
old age brings peace and freedom [ἐλεςθεπία] from all such things. When the
appetites [αἱ ἐπιθςμίαι] relax and cease to importune us, everything Sophocles
said comes to pass, and we escape from [ἀπηλλάσθαι] many mad masters. If
[people] are moderate [κόζμιοι] and contented [εὔκολοι], old age, too, is only
moderately onerous; if they aren‘t, both old age and youth are hard to bear.
(329c4-d1)
Here Cephalus distinguishes between appetitive desires and the self through the image of
the appetites as ‗mad masters‘ seeking to control an individual‘s actions. Thus, we find a
concept of freedom as a state in which appetitive desires do not drive the person‘s
actions. His brief comments suggest that the cessation of the appetites leads to autonomy
48
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and conversely, that giving in to appetites may hinder freedom.
Cephalus‘ remarks hint at a more sophisticated division of desires with his
distinction between appetitive desires and the true desires of the person, as seen in the
above quote. In all of his works Plato associates freedom with the ability to fulfill desires,
and he, too, distinguishes worthy and unworthy desires of the soul parts. This association
of freedom with the pursuit of desires demonstrates the ethical egoism underlying
Platonic thought. Following Bernard Williams, I take ethical egoism to be the view that
―each man has good reason to act morally, and that the good reason has to appeal to him
in terms of something about himself, how and what he will be if he is a man of that sort
of character.‖49 The reason behind action is ultimately the fulfillment of the desire to live
well. 50 This does not preclude recognition of the value of virtuous action in itself, nor
does it necessarily exclude caring for the well-being of others, for care of others may
prove valuable for its own sake, not simply instrumentally. 51
iii.

Concern for Others

The ethical dimension of Cephalus‘ view of justice provides further insight into
how Plato regards popular Greek conceptions of freedom. Socrates summarizes
Cephalus‘ notion of justice as ―speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has
incurred‖ (331c1-2). This normative definition of justice betrays a concern for others that
makes his corresponding definition of freedom ethical in nature. Thus, we have a
49
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conception of freedom as following the rules of society, namely, honoring commitments
without harming others.
Although Socrates‘ version of freedom will include an ethical orientation similar
to Cephalus‘, Cephalus goes astray in mistaking the source of this freedom. He believes
that the freedom to be just in this fashion comes from wealth. Cephalus‘ love of money, a
trait of the appetitive soul,52 misleads him into thinking that having and spending money,
particularly in sacrifices to the gods, gives him the power to do what he wants without
trouble: ―Wealth can do a lot to save us from having to cheat or deceive someone against
our will and from having to depart for that other place in fear because we owe sacrifice to
a god or money to a person‖ (331b1-3).53 Socrates‘ poverty is a glaring challenge to this
view54 and it points to a non-material source for Platonic freedom.
iv.

Lack of Knowledge

Cephalus‘ psychological and ethical focus foreshadows important features of
Plato‘s theory of freedom. However, Plato also uses Cephalus to exemplify the pitfalls of
relying on beliefs rather than knowledge. Cephalus simply accepts the ethical
conventions of his society without questioning them. 55 As a result, he does not fully
understand the rules and he may end up breaking them out of ignorance. He indicates
uncertainty in his beliefs about justice. Childhood stories of punishments of the unjust in
52

580e1-4.
Presumably, Cephalus considers only honestly-earned money as giving one freedom, as dishonest
practices would conflict with his definition of justice. However, the discussion of the tyrant will show that
having wealth does not guarantee justice. In fact, the Platonic theory of freedom will argue that focus on
wealth can endanger the soul.
54
See Annas 1981, 19.
55
See Annas 1981, 20: ―what matters is whether or not you perform certain actions, like sacrificing to the
gods, and not the spirit in which this is done.‖
53

20

Hades have begun to weigh on him more as he approaches death:
when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about
things he didn‘t fear before. It‘s then that the stories we‘re told about Hades,
about how people who‘ve been unjust here must pay the penalty there—stories he
used to make fun of—twist his soul this way and that for fear they‘re true.
(330d)56
Cephalus‘ anxiety about his fate in the afterlife can be attributed to lack of knowledge
about justice. Uncertain about the gods‘ views on justice, Cephalus is frantically trying to
ensure himself a good afterlife. Thus, he bows out of the discussion in order to make
sacrifices that he thinks will improve his chances in the afterlife, rather than remaining
with Socrates to philosophize (331d). Cephalus represents the ‗slavish virtue‘ discussed
in the Phaedo: ―…without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue;
it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth‖ (69b5-7). Because slavish virtue
derives from diminished appetites and fear of the afterlife, his is a false freedom.
v.

The Analogy of Political Freedom

After Book 1‘s treatment of conventional justice, the focus of the Republic shifts
towards evaluating conceptions of political justice. The five constitutions that Plato
examines each maintain a theory of freedom inherent in each concept of justice. Political
freedom can be defined roughly as individuals being able to pursue desired actions
without externally imposed constraints. Plato recounts a progression of systematic
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political and psychological decay from one form of government to another, finally ending
in tyranny. Each system is epitomized by psychological states of each type of ruler or
rulers.57 Within both the cities and the rulers‘ souls, Plato considers the power struggle
between three main elements: the rational, the spirited and the appetitive. In the city
these parts of the soul translate to the rulers, the auxiliaries and the producers,
respectively. In the city, the three groups are vying for political power, just as there is a
psychological battle occurring between the three corresponding soul parts. Throughout
the Republic, Plato focuses attention continually inwards towards the state of the soul.
Even the political analysis of the rise and fall of each city constitution centers upon a
psychological group profile of each political faction. Indeed, if we take seriously Bernard
Williams‘ claim that ―Plato was not in the first instance concerned with political
freedom,‖58 then Plato‘s extensive discussions of political systems in the Republic can
and should be taken as part of his discussion of individual freedom.
The Republic establishes five varieties of political freedom. All forms of
government, except the justly run city, place value on the wrong things. This faulty
grounding leads to a false conception of freedom. Following the city-soul analogy, five
types of individual soul arrangements correspond to each political constitution. The best
city constitution is the republic ruled by the philosopher-king, wherein the military and
merchant classes are subordinate to the philosophers. The state of this city resembles the
individual soul of the philosopher-king, whereby the philosophical part of the soul rules
the lower parts. Although two factions are subordinate in this arrangement, the state is
57
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said to be harmonious because the reasoning element is naturally suited to rule the other
elements.59
The subsequent four states discussed in Books 8 and 9 are ruled by the naturally
inferior factions, causing instability within the leadership. The second best state is the
timocracy, which is the result of honor-loving individuals ruling by military aristocracy.
Correspondingly, the timocratic ruler is led by the spirited part of the soul. Plato judges
oligarchy, rule of the rich, to be the third best city government. Oligarchs have souls that
are governed by the necessary appetites.60 The fourth best form of government is
democracy, citizen rule, in which the governing have souls dominated by unnecessary
appetites. Finally, tyranny is deemed the worst constitution because its ruler acts on his
lawless and unnecessary appetitive desires.
The concept of political freedom enters the descriptions of the various forms of
rule implicitly in the elucidation of power structures in each society. In all governments
except democracy, one ruling class restricts the political freedom of the other classes
according to its perceived good. The democratic city, unlike the other constitutions
discussed, makes rule open to every citizen. Democracy is founded on the principle of
―an equal share [ἐξ ἴσου] in ruling, under the constitution, . . . for the most part assigning
people to rule by lot [ἀπό κλήρων]‖ (557a3-5).
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b. „The Unmixed Wine of Freedom‟: Plato‟s Critique of Democratic
Freedom in the Republic
In Socrates‘ analysis of democracy, he points to freedom [τήν ἐλευθερίαν] itself
as the ultimate value in a democracy: ―Surely you‘d hear a democratic city say that this
is the finest thing it has, so that as a result it is the only city worth living in for someone
who is by nature free [φύσει ἐλεύθερος]‖ (562b12-c2). The democratic city is described
as being ―full of freedom [ἐλευθερίας] and freedom of speech [παρρησίας]‖ (557b3-4).
Everyone in the city is said to ―have the license [ἐξουσία] to do what he wants‖ (557b45). Socrates calls the democratic person, himself, free as well (557b3). Hence, Plato
associates the political freedom of democracy with liberty to pursue whatever one desires
without government interference in more private settings. Thus, a study of Plato‘s
conception of freedom must pay particular attention to democracy, given that Plato
observes the importance of a concept of freedom as a main democratic value. Since
democracy is given the status of runner-up for least desirable system of government,
behind tyranny, democratic freedom must be deficient as well. In this section, I will
examine Plato‘s assessment of democratic freedom. For behind Plato‘s criticisms of
democratic freedom, we see a Platonic conception of freedom taking shape.
i.

The Democratic Soul

As with the other forms of government, Plato provides a psychological biography
of how a generic democrat emerges in society, again paralleling city and psychological
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types.61 He depicts a battle between the parts of the soul for rule of the whole soul. The
archetypal democratic man is the oligarch‘s son who rebels against his father, driven by
the unnecessary desires of the appetitive part of the soul. Unnecessary desires go beyond
what is beneficial for well-being and survival. Instead, these desires are ―harmful both to
the body and to the reason and moderation of the soul‖ (559b11-c1). These desires can be
suppressed by most people through restraint and education while they are young
(559b10-11). However, by indulging these unnecessary desires, the appetitive part of the
soul is emboldened. Eventually, ―seeing the citadel of the young man‘s soul empty of
knowledge, fine ways of living, and words of truth,‖ the unnecessary desires overtake the
soul (560b6-9).
However, there is some hope for the older democrat:
if he is lucky, and his frenzy doesn‘t go too far . . . he welcomes back some of the
exiles, ceases to surrender himself completely to the newcomers, and puts his
pleasures on an equal footing. And so he lives, always surrendering rule over
himself to whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot. And when
that is satisfied, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but satisfying
them all equally. (561a5-b5)
The older democrat‘s psychic health is somewhat better than the younger‘s
because instead of only bowing to necessary and unnecessary desires, he embodies some
virtues as well, such as reverence and moderation. Thus, the older democrat has some
capacity to respond to reason. However, Plato deems the chance of recovery from
61
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democracy slight, even for the older democrat:
he doesn‘t admit any word of truth into the guardhouse, for if someone tells him
that some pleasures belong to fine and good desires and others to base62 ones and
that he must pursue and value the former and restrain and enslave the latter, he
denies all this and declares that all pleasures are equal and must be valued
equally. (561b7-c3)63
Hence, the democrat exhibits the same lack of knowledge of the Good that Cephalus does
at the beginning of the Republic.
ii.

Freedom in the Democratic City

Plato emphasizes that democratic freedom involves citizens having an equal share
in the rule and direction of the city. 64 Democracy is introduced into the dissolving
oligarchy under a new principle of equal opportunity of all citizens to rule, put into
practice by assigning rule by lot (557a3-5). The introduction of a lot signifies the equal
qualification of all citizens to serve in leadership roles. 65 Thus, democratic freedom
entails the opportunity, but also the obligation, to rule when your number comes up. The
equality of opportunity is not based upon merit, but rather on the chance of the lot in
choosing one‘s name to be part of the governing body. The only criteria for eligibility are
being a male citizen.
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Plato suggests that this equality in government carries over into private life. One
characteristic of democratic freedom seems to be that each citizen retains the authority to
arrange his life however he pleases.66 Further, democracy provides many examples of
lifestyles, as well as the liberty to pursue whichever lifestyle is appealing. The democratic
city ―contains the most models of constitutions and ways of living‖ (561e4-5), creating a
veritable ―supermarket of constitutions‖ (557d5-6). Hence, the right to live any way one
pleases assumes a certain equality of all, or most, possible ways of living. The political
equality of democratic freedom results in the liberty to live one‘s life unimpeded by
government and the assumption of equality of all ways of life. Thus, democratic freedom
includes both individual freedom and political freedom in that both one‘s private
activities67 and one‘s right to political participation are protected.
Socrates comments on the captivating variety of ways of life in a democracy:
it looks as though this is the finest or most beautiful of the constitutions, For like a
coat embroidered with every kind of ornament, this city, embroidered with every
kind of character type, would seem to be the most beautiful. And many people
would probably judge it to be so. (557c3-6)
The description of democracy as inspiring awe in its variety is reminiscent of the
discussion of lovers of sights and sounds in Book 5, where Socrates says: ―The lovers of
sights and sounds like beautiful sounds, colors, shapes and everything fashioned out of
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them‖ (476b3-4). However, lovers of sights and sounds are said to be ―living in a dream‖
because they mistake likenesses of beauty for the form of the beautiful itself. Socrates
pronounces that ―their thought is unable to see and embrace the nature of the beautiful
itself‖ (476b4-5). Similarly, Plato indicates that the democrat mistakes the freedom to
satisfy all of his desires for the true freedom that is achieved by the philosopher.
iii.

The Dangers of Democratic Equality

All of Plato‘s criticisms stem from his dissatisfaction with all citizens
participating in ruling, regardless of individual capabilities, experience or personal
qualities. 68 Democracy, he says, gives ―no thought to what someone was doing before he
entered public life‖ (558b6-7). Plato‘s concern here is that some individuals are not fit to
rule, but democracy allows and encourages the rule of such persons in the interest of
equality and fairness. Hence, democracy ―distributes a sort of equality to both equals and
unequals alike‖ (558c5-6), even though all individuals are not equally worthy of or
capable of handling the power that democracy offers. However, Plato does not abandon
the notion of equality entirely. In the Laws, Plato employs what he suggests is a fairer
conception of equality in his modified version of the ideal city. Like democracy, the city
in the Laws makes use of a lot system of governance while at the same time accounting
for individuals‘ past histories and merit in serving in office:
. . . some people will arrive with relatively large fortunes, others with relatively
little. So for a number of reasons, and especially because the state offers equality
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of opportunity [καιρῶν ἰσότητος], there must be graded property-classes, to
ensure that the offices and taxes and grants may be arranged on the basis of what
a man is worth. It‘s not only his personal virtues or his ancestors‘ that should be
considered, or his physical strength or good looks: what he‘s made of his wealth
or poverty should also be taken into account. In short, citizens must be esteemed
and given office, so far as possible, on exactly equal terms of ―proportional
inequality‖ [τῷ ἀνίσῳ συμμέτρῳ], so as to avoid ill-feeling. (Laws 744b4-c4)
Likewise, the Gorgias mentions a similar notion of ―proportionate equality‖ [ἡ ἰσότης ἡ
γεωμετρική] (508a6). Plato recognizes that no new society should disregard its citizens‘
previous activities and abilities. Nor does he think that all individuals should have an
equal say in governmental matters, for some individuals are better suited to governance
and have more relevant experience than others. In democracy, value is placed upon all
voices being heard and weighted equally, thereby decreasing the influence of the
opinions of true leaders and experts. Of course, it is the philosophers whom Plato deems
most capable to rule. Philosophers ―are fitted by nature both to engage in philosophy and
to rule in a city, while the rest are naturally fitted to leave philosophy alone and follow
their leader‖ (474b6-8). Hence, democracy disregards the natural aptitudes of
philosophers to rule and the naturalness of others to follow good leaders. Plato is
concerned that ignoring the true nature of individuals in this way leads to instability and
jeopardizes the government‘s reign.
Not only does democracy ignore the natural distinction between philosophers and
non-philosophers, but Plato suggests that democratic freedom eventually destroys all

29

social hierarchies: ―The utmost freedom for the majority is reached in such a city when
bought slaves, both male and female, are no less free than those who bought them‖
(563b3-5).69 Democracy supplants natural social hierarchies such as ruler-subject, fatherson, teacher-student, master-slave and even man-animal. Socrates presents a slippery
slope argument that democratic freedom blurs all social distinctions. However, there is
some irony in these disapproving statements about democracy‘s equality. For Plato
proposes some radical egalitarian ideas of his own, such as the possibility of philosopherqueens (456a6) and the potential for ‗lower-born‘ but talented individuals to rise to
higher ranking positions in his ideal city (415c2-4). There is a certain equality of
opportunity in the ideal city. However, in the kallipolis one gains authority through merit
and natural talent, not simply by being born a citizen.
iv.

Wine as a Symbol of Freedom

The parameters of democratic governance are strictly limited, so that the chosen
rulers must act on the desires of the majority, not simply of their own accord. Thus, the
political officials are perhaps least free because their actions are limited severely by their
constituents‘ wishes. If some rulers actually attempt to rule using their own ideas, rather
than the majority‘s, and if others willingly follow them as subjects, Plato says that these
rulers will be ―accused of being accursed oligarchs‖ and punished by the city (562c8-d3).
The rulers in this scenario are said to be getting drunk by drinking more of the ―unmixed
wine‖ [ἀκράτου] of freedom [τὴν ἐλευθερίαν] than they should (562c8-d2). Even
though Plato employs the negative connotation of drunkenness for those who attempt to
69
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rule, he shows sympathy for this group of would-be rulers and their willing ‗slaves‘.
Freedom is presented as a potent wine that can easily overcome those in leadership
positions by pushing them to use their own ideas to shape the city. Here Plato presents
those overcome by freedom in a more positive light. However, in Book 9‘s description of
the tyrant, we see the consequences of a more inept individual getting ―drunk‖ on
freedom‘s power.
There is a similarity between the depiction of freedom as unmixed wine and
Plato‘s simile of the Good as being like the intense light of the sun in Books 6 and 7 of
the Republic. Both analogies refer to an object that is intoxicating and disorienting when
experienced directly. The subject, infused with the Good or with freedom, appears
ridiculous or drunk to spectators who are unfamiliar with these experiences. However,
both the examples of the tyrant in Book 9 and the ridiculous philosopher coming back
into the darkness of the cave in Book 7 suggest that the philosopher must learn to
modulate his response to the experience of both wine and cognitive illumination. Plato
confirms this in the Laws by advocating drinking parties to test out potential rulers
(645d1-649b7). He describes the response of the ideal ruler to wine:
While inevitably roused by the wine, he would show himself strong enough to
escape its other effects: his virtue would prevent him from committing even one
serious improper act, and from becoming a different kind of person. Before
getting to the last round he would leave off, fearing the way in which drink
invariably gets the better of a man. (Laws 648e1-5)
This section of the Laws shows Plato‘s continued concern with the moderation of city
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rulers when faced with the temptation to abuse their power. Further, wine continues to be
an apt analogy for the dangerous freedom that comes with ruling.
The portrayal of freedom as unmixed wine shows the inherent instability of
democratic freedom. For those chosen to rule are in a position of power that can be
intoxicating. Expecting everyone to be able to handle such a position moderately, without
proper education in moderation is naïve, as Socrates explains: ―And what about the
uneducated who have no experience of truth? Isn‘t it likely . . . that they will never
adequately govern a city? . . . [They] would fail because they don‘t have a single goal at
which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim‖ (519b6-c2). This statement
suggests that the adequate ruler has experience of the truth and directs all of his actions
towards a single goal, the Good. For Plato this is the proper response to the freedom
concomitant with rule.
v.

Anarchy and Amorality

Democracy does not value one way of life over another. This includes the
philosophical life devoted to the Good. Instead, the freedom to live however one pleases
is esteemed over any one particular way of life, in effect demoting the importance of the
philosophical life. Without public endorsement or guidance towards the philosophical
life, the soul becomes easily distracted by the immediacy of satisfying lower pleasures.
As a result, the philosophical life is marginalized in favor of gratifying the increasingly
dominant appetitive part of the soul. For the desires of the lower soul are more immediate
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and stronger70 than those of the reasoning element, which must be trained and developed.
The embrace of equality in governance and the acceptance of many lifestyles encourages
the view that all pleasures are of equal value. Plato argues that the equality of all pursuits
in democracy fosters the confusion of virtues with vices. The democrat confuses
insolence with good breeding, extravagance with magnificence and shamelessness with
courage (560e4-5). If all actions and ways of life are considered equally valuable it
becomes difficult to distinguish and praise those virtues that Plato deems more worthy of
praise. Thus, a main problem with democracy is its mistaken assessment of equality and
freedom as the good, at the expense of the true Good. In this way, the democratic society
is not governed by the Good of Platonic metaphysics. For action towards development of
one‘s philosophical life is considered equal to all other potential actions, such as
attending a play or participating in sports. For Plato, all activities and desires are not
equal. Philosophical activities are definitively better than all other activities. However,
democracy cannot embrace any such moral scheme without jeopardizing its constitutional
equality.
A further criticism of democracy is that it leads to anarchy since it lacks rational
moral principles. In fact, Socrates accuses democratic supporters of mistaking anarchy
[ἀναρχίαν] for freedom (560e4). Here, anarchy means a lack of any leadership or
organizing principle in the direction of one‘s life other than spontaneous hedonism; it is
lawlessness. Socrates depicts the democrat‘s life as giving in to a constant succession of
competing desires:
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And so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes he
drinks heavily while listening to the flute; at other times, he drinks only water
and is on a diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other times, he‘s
idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself with what
he takes to be philosophy. He often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat
and saying and doing whatever comes into his mind. If he happens to admire
soldiers, he‘s carried in that direction, if money-makers, in that one. There‘s
neither order nor necessity [οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη] in his life, but he calls
it pleasant, free [ἐλευθέριον], and blessedly happy, and he follows it for as long
as he lives. (561a4-b5)
This passage indicates the importance of order and necessity in the city. 71 In the ideal
city, all activity is directed towards instantiating the Good by employing both order and
necessity. Education is carried out in an orderly manner, progressing in difficulty and
subject matter. Further, the aim of working towards the Good necessitates that certain
actions be carried out in certain ways. Nothing is left to chance in the ideal city. Even the
philosophically-minded must play the correct games and follow a fine way of life from
early childhood to ensure that they become good (558b1-c1).
Democracy, on the other hand, ignores such minutiae, ultimately at its own peril,
in Plato‘s view. For the budding anarchy in democracy leaves it ripe for tyranny.
However, the democrat‘s life is not entirely lawless, since he enjoys the oligarchic and
the more hedonistic life each in moderation (572c9-10). Neither can the democrat‘s life
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be described as slavish, for he does not devote himself to any one idea or activity fully.
Thus, the democrat is moderate in his indulgences, at the expense of indulging in the
search for truth fully. Plato paints this as a natural consequence of living in a democracy
that values equality. Just as all citizen-rulers are of equal status, so are the various
interests and desires within each individual. Yet, Plato aims to show that if no one
principle rules city or citizen, there is anarchy. Although the democrat says that equality
and freedom rule democracy, in fact, these values on their own merely foster the rule of
the lower soul‘s unnecessary desires if they are not grounded in an ethical system. These
desires tend to take over if left unchecked without any moral guidance. 72
Hence, the worst danger of the democratic system is that it ends up being
directed by the lowest desires of the majority. It is these desires that are dominant
within democratic citizens (559c9-10; 564d7-8). The majority of citizens will be
dominated by the lowest, appetitive soul-part, as is natural for the largest
proportion of the population. 73 As such, the decisions of the city council will
reflect those values, neglecting the values of the spirited and reasoning elements
of the soul, which make up increasingly smaller proportions of society,
respectively. Thus, government decisions will not be based on reason and the
ultimate Good but on the majority of base viewpoints. Plato describes the impact
of the mob psychology that he judges to be present in democracy on an educated
person, as follows:
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When many of them are sitting together in assemblies, courts, theaters,
army camps, or in some other public gathering of the crowd, they object
very loudly and excessively to some of the things that are said or done and
approve others in the same way, shouting and clapping, so that the very
rocks and surroundings echo the din of their praise or blame and double it.
In circumstances like that, what is the effect, as they say, on a young
person‘s heart? What private training can hold out and not be swept away
by that kind of praise or blame and be carried by the flood wherever it
goes, so that he‘ll say that the same things are beautiful or ugly as the
crowd does, follow the same way of life as they do, and be the same sort
of person as they are? (492b4-c7)
More worrisome for Plato is his belief that a person with a philosophical nature
growing up in the unsuitable environment of mob rule fares worse than the
ordinary person (491d6-7). In such an environment the philosophically inclined
―will develop in quite the opposite way, 74 unless some god happens to come to its
rescue‖ (492a3-4).75
All of Plato‘s criticisms of democratic freedom are directed towars its principle of
equality. This principle of equality of citizens in shared governance trickles down to all
facets of life, from the way individuals live their lives to their internal psychologies.
Presumed equality in the right of all citizens to govern entails the tolerance of other ways
of life. Plato sees this tolerance as anathema to moral education. For the privileging of
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one way of life undermines the value of other ways of life. Thus, the ultimate criticism of
democratic freedom is that it is amoral. In opposition to this, Plato, seeks to infuse his
own concept of freedom with the ethical content of the form of the Good, which is
grounded in knowledge.
c. The Tyrant‟s Freedom
One threat that democracy poses, in Plato‘s view, is that it easily lapses into
tyranny. Thus, in a sense, his discussion of tyranny can be viewed as a continuation of the
criticisms of democracy, aimed at swaying democrats more than would-be tyrants.
Democracy‘s proximity to tyranny in Plato‘s political devolutionary scheme is meant as a
final blow to the democratic principles of equality, tolerance, and the resulting
lawlessness of democratic society. By showing democracy as one step away from
tyranny, perhaps Plato hopes to shock democrats into recognizing that their system of
governance allows the lowest desires to rule, undisciplined. However, Plato‘s stinging
critiques of democracy and tyranny leave the door open to freedom conceived of in a new
way. Plato‘s treatment of tyranny in the Republic solidifies the case that he is putting
forward a new, ethical concept of freedom and that his hostility is directed towards what
he considers false and inadequate conceptions of freedom, not freedom in toto.
i.

Callicles‟ Tyranny in the Gorgias

With the character of Callicles in the Gorgias, Plato introduces the immoralist76
view of freedom which appears again in the Republic. This view of freedom is the
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ultimate foil to Plato‘s philosophical freedom. 77 Callicles uses the nomos-physis
distinction78 to argue that the weak have defined justice in their favor so that all may have
a fair share, while in nature justice is ―for the better man and the more capable man to
have a greater share than the worse man and less capable man‖ (Gorgias 483d1-3).
Hence, these ―better‖, intelligent men should rule the city (Gorgias 491d1-3). In order to
counter these claims, Socrates introduces an introspective definition of freedom: ―being
self-controlled and master of oneself, ruling the pleasures and appetites within oneself‖
(Gorgias 491d11-e2).79 However, Callicles calls men who act in such a way stupid.
Instead, Callicles argues,
the man who‘ll live correctly ought to allow his own appetites to get as large as
possible and not restrain them. And when they are as large as possible, he ought
to be competent to devote himself to them by virtue of his bravery and
intelligence, and to fill them with whatever he may have an appetite for at the
time. (491e9-492a4)
Callicles‘ summary of his own argument confirms that he is putting forward an
assessment of freedom: ―wantonness, lack of discipline, and freedom [ἐλευθερία], if
available in good supply, are excellence and happiness‖ (Gorgias 492c4-5). Socrates
counters Callicles‘ praise of insatiable appetite with the image of the soul as a sieve and
the appetitive part as a leaky jar (Gorgias 493a1-c3). He extends the analogy to include
the maintenance and filling of one‘s jars only as much as required to keep them satiated.
In contrast, Socrates describes Callicles‘ undisciplined man: ―his containers are leaky
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and rotten. He‘s forced to keep on filling them, day and night, or else he suffers extreme
pain‖ (Gorgias 493e7-494a2). Callicles eventually accepts Socrates‘ distinction between
good and bad pleasures, thus surrendering to Socrates. However, Callicles‘ view remains
a challenge both to conventional morality exemplified by Cephalus, and to the moral
freedom that Plato wishes to argue for. It is only in the Republic, when he is enlists the
tripartite psychology that Plato more fully develops a response to the immoralist views of
Callicles.80
ii.

Tyranny in the Republic

The specter of the tyrant is present from the start of the Republic. Witness
Polemarchus jokingly threatening Socrates: ―you must either prove stronger
[κρείττους]81 than we are, or you will have to stay here‖ (327c9-10). When Socrates
suggests the alternative of him persuading the group to release him, Polemarchus rejects
this option: ―But could you persuade [πεῖσαι], if we won‘t listen?‖ (327c12) In this
first scene, Polemarchus is modeling what we might call the tyrant‘s conception of justice
as someone who disregards the sway of reason in favor of whichever desire arises in him
at that moment. Polemarchus‘ exhibits the urge to dominate, a tendency that can in an
unjust state into tyrannical pathology. This tyrant‘s conception of freedom is the absolute
power to fulfill all of his desires at any time. Thrasymachus and Glaucon each champion
the tyrant‘s freedom in Books 1 and 2.
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However, the champion of the immoralist view in the Republic, Thrasymachus, offers a lesser version of
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iii.

Thrasymachus

Thrasymachus shifts the discussion towards a definition of freedom based upon
power and wealth gained dishonestly. He defines justice by focussing solely on the
desires of the agent, which he describes as ―the advantage of the stronger‖ (338c1-2). By
way of explanation Thrasymachus brings up various government constitutions to show
that justice is simply ―the advantage of the established rule‖ (338e5). Thus, the
established ruling powers label activities that benefit themselves as just irrespective of the
consequences for their subjects. This position may be termed narrow egoism, in that the
care of others is entirely instrumental towards achieving one‘s own benefit. 82 Socrates
attacks this narrow egoism by suggesting that concern for others motivates rulers‘
actions, not their own concerns. He argues that those in positions of rule seek what is
advantageous for their subjects, not themselves (342e).
Reversing conventional attributions of justice and injustice, Thrasymachus argues
that the unjust life is the best life to live. In his view, tyranny is the complete expression
of injustice and the happiest possible life (344a5-6). Further, he associates tyrannical rule
with freedom explicitly: ―injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer
[ἐλευθεριώτερον], and more masterly than justice‖ (344c3-4). Thrasymachus
represents the viewpoint that the ultimate freedom is tyranny, the unhampered ability to
pursue whatever one desires. Thrasymachan freedom involves subordinating all other
individuals and their desires to the tyrant‘s whims. Because it lacks any other-regarding
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features this philosophy may be termed immoral. 83 Socrates presents an opposing view
of freedom as the ethically-motivated action of a harmonious soul.
However, Socrates does not reject Thrasymachus‘ conception of freedom as the
pursuit of one‘s desires in general. Rather, he appeals to it. He retorts to Thrasymachus
that one cannot accomplish one‘s goals by being indiscriminately unjust to everyone
because the resultant hatred and civil war will prevent the achievement of one‘s purpose
(351d-e). Hence, one would be unfree if one were prevented from pursuing one‘s desires.
Thus, one must benefit some people in order to continue to accomplish one‘s goals
without one‘s rule being overthrown. In this way, Socrates reintroduces an ethical tone
into the conversation by including the treatment of others as important. 84 He thereby
introduces virtue into the discussion of injustice (348c2-3). Socrates then applies his
political analysis to the individual: ―And even in a single individual, [injustice] has the
very same effect. First, it makes him incapable of achieving anything, because he is in a
state of civil war and not of one mind [οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα]; second, it makes him his
own enemy, as well as the enemy of just people‖ (352a5-8). Again, Socrates returns to
the idea planted by Cephalus, that one may have conflicting desires and that only some
desires are authentic to the person and worthy of pursuit.85
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iv.

Glaucon and Gyges

In Book 2, Glaucon continues Thrasymachus‘ argument that justice is the
advantage of the stronger86 by proposing his thought experiment about Gyges‘ ring. 87
The tyrant‘s concept of freedom is again central to this thought experiment. While
introducing his tale, Glaucon refers to freedom: ―The freedom [ἐξουσία]88 I mentioned
would be most easily realized if both people had the power [δύναμιν]89 they say the
ancestor of Gyges of Lydia possessed‖ (359c9-10). Glaucon relates the story of a
shepherd who discovers a magic ring that allows him to become invisible to others.
Gyges‘ ring gives people the freedom to pursue their hidden desires because there is no
fear of punishment for actions normally deemed unacceptable by society. Taking
advantage of the power to act with impunity, Gyges seduces the king‘s wife, murders the
king, and usurps his rule.
Glaucon asks, why be just if it makes one less free? He states that ―those who
practice justice do it unwillingly [ἄκοντες] and because they lack the power to do
injustice‖ (359b6-c1). Glaucon argues that actions labeled as just are practiced as a means
to selfish ends rather than because of the intrinsic worth of justice. Like Thrasymachus,
he argues that the life of injustice is better than the life of justice (358b7-c5). He defines
freedom as the ability to pursue desires that are conventionally labeled unjust. When
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allowed to pursue one‘s desires unhindered, everyone would follow his base desires,
according to the thought experiment. In this case, justice hampers one‘s ability to pursue
one‘s desires. Hence, for him freedom is the ability to do injustice without being harmed
oneself.
Glaucon asks whether a just person and an unjust person would both behave in the
same way if each was granted the power of invisibility. He maintains that both sorts of
people would behave the same way—unjustly. Given the opportunity to do injustice
without being held responsible for one‘s actions by society, even the so-called just would
succumb. Justice is only skin deep. People are just simply because they are required to be
just by society to avoid punishment and gain rewards. Thus, Gyges, like the tyrant, is
truly free because his actions are not constrained by laws or customs. Gyges is able to
pursue his desires unhindered. Glaucon argues that anyone in the same situation would
pursue his base and unjust desires. The story claims that humans‘ deepest desires do not
accord with their outwardly just behavior so that, given the chance to do whatever they
want without consequence, all people would behave unjustly.
The Gyges thought experiment 90 ends with the juxtaposition of two possible lives,
the life of the unjust who is thought just and the life of the just man who is presumed
unjust. The clandestinely just man ―will be whipped, stretched on a rack, chained, blinded
with fire, and, at the end, when he has suffered every kind of evil, he‘ll be impaled‖
(361e2-5). On the other hand, the secretly unjust man reaps the benefits of justice because
of his reputation. By laying out the two possible lives plainly, Glaucon presents Socrates
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with the difficult task of showing why the life of justice is best in all cases, even when
one endures great suffering to be just. Socrates must show that the truly just are better off
than the superficially just and that justice is to be valued for its intrinsic worth, rather
than its external benefits. For the interlocutors imply that the life of injustice, especially
when concealed, is freer, and thereby happier.
v.

Political Tyranny

In Book 9 of the Republic, Plato examines the tyrant again after presenting his
metaphysics of the Good in the middle books. As noted above, Plato views tyranny as the
inevitable result of democracy‘s excessive focus on freedom. Democracy‘s demise comes
from its citizens‘ eventual lawlessness in the face of having no unifying principle. In the
end, the citizens ―take no notice of the laws, whether written or unwritten, in order to
avoid having any master at all‖ (563d7-8). With a lack of order, the worst elements of
society are better able to wrest control of the city. Plato explains this degeneration into
tyranny by arguing that ―excessive action in one direction usually sets up a reaction in the
opposite direction‖, as evidenced ―in seasons, in plants, in bodies, and, last but not least,
in constitutions‖ (563e9-11). Therefore, he says that ―extreme freedom [ἄγαν
ἐλευθερία] can‘t be expected to lead to anything but a change to extreme slavery [ἄγαν
δουλείαν], whether for a private individual or for a city‖ (564a3-4).91 Superficially, the
contrast between democracy and tyranny appears to be large. However, Plato also
indicates that democracy‘s decline into tyranny is a natural culmination of democratic
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principles taken to their extreme. In tyranny, the freedom of democracy is concentrated in
one person. Hence, tyranny shares many of the same potential towards lawlessness
present in democracy.
Plato‘s analogy of city and soul converges in book 9 as the leadership of the city
comes under one man again, as with the philosopher-king. However, the ruler who
emerges as a solution to the civil war of the degenerating democracy is shown to be the
polar opposite of the benevolent philosopher-ruler. Socrates determines that there is a
naturalness to the democratic city supporting a single ruler. For he says that the people
are ―always in the habit of setting up one man as their special champion, nurturing him
and making him great‖ (565c9-10). Plato warns that it only takes one major act of
iniquity to push this man into becoming a tyrant, such as trying another person on false
charges and then murdering him. 92
However, the tyrant begins his reign under the guise of peacemaker by freeing
people from debt and redistributing land. Thus, the tyrant aims to maintain a state of civil
war against the rich ―so that the people will continue to feel the need of a leader‖ (566e67). Further, the wars require war taxes, thereby draining any newly redistributed wealth
so that the people become impoverished and focused on their daily needs rather than on
plotting against the tyrant. If some ―free spirits‖93 [ἐλεύθερα φρονήματα] do not favor
his rule, the tyrant will find a way to punish them (567a4-6). Thus, the tyrant is portrayed
as the enemy of freedom and Plato identifies tyranny as the removal of the people‘s
freedom.
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The tyrant is also taking advantage of disharmony already percolating in the
democracy and he is simply deepening the discord. He uses certain factions to gain
power. However, given that ―the bravest of those who helped to establish his tyranny and
who hold positions of power within it speak freely [παρρησιάζεσθαι] with each other
and to him, criticizing what‘s happening‖ (567b3-5), the tyrant must eventually purge
such men who are ―brave, large-minded, knowledgeable, or rich‖ (567b10-11). Thus,
instead of expelling the worst elements, as a healer would, the tyrant must expel the best
people and leave the worst in order to preserve his authority. Therefore he frees foreign
drones and slaves, his only possible allies, to become his bodyguards. Socrates compares
the tyrant‘s situation to that of a wealthy slave-owner, who is deposited with his family
and slaves in a deserted place, ―where no free person could come to his assistance‖
(578e3-4). The result is that he would ―be compelled to fawn on some of his own slaves,
promise them lots of things, and free them, even though he didn‘t want to . . . And
wouldn‘t he himself have become a panderer to slaves?‖ (578e7-579a2). Thus, although
the tyrant would seem to have the most power to fulfill his desires, in fact, he must make
many concessions in order to placate his allies and to keep his position.
The tyrant is finally recognized as the tyrant that he is when he uses up the city‘s
resources and is forced to rely upon the people of the city for sustenance, enslaving them
completely (568d6-8). Plato compares this to parricide. For the people who had helped to
nurture the tyrant into a leader, initially hoping to be freed from the rich, are now
―enslaved to their own slave‖ (569a1). The supposed champion of the people‘s freedom
has become the people‘s slave master. Plato compares the change from democracy to
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tyranny by using the terms of freedom and enslavement consistently: ―by trying to avoid
the [smoke]94 of enslavement to free men [δουλείας ἐλευθέρων], the people have fallen
into the fire of having slaves as their masters, and . . . in the place of that great but
inappropriate freedom [ἀκαίρου ἐλευθερίας] they enjoyed under democracy, they have
put upon themselves the harshest and most bitter slavery to slaves‖ (569b7-c3). The term
―great but inappropriate freedom‖ indicates that the freedom experienced in democracy is
not the optimum state of freedom.
vi.

The Psychology of a Tyrant

From his description of the creation of the tyrannical state, Plato turns to the
psychology of the tyrant himself. By definition, everyone except the tyrant is a slave to
the tyrant in the tyrannical state. However, Plato aims to show that the tyrant, himself,
does not experience genuine freedom either. With the discussion of tyranny Plato returns
to the main question of the Republic: is justice good in itself or merely for its
consequences?95 This question was first broached in Book 2, with the example of Gyges‘
ring. The tyrant, although visible in his actions, also acts with impunity because of his
complete power over his city.
The tyrant is the paradigm of injustice, so by showing the tyrant to be unhappy
Plato confirms the deficiency of injustice. However, what is important for my discussion
is that Plato substantiates his argument by using a concept of freedom. In his analysis of
democratic psychology, Plato hints at a psychological concept of freedom. Now, with the
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tyrant, concepts of psychological freedom and slavery play a large role in trying to show
that the life of the tyrant is unpleasant in reality. In order to analyze the tyrant‘s
individual psychology, Socrates determines that a discussion of desire [ἐπιθυμία] is
necessary. Freedom takes on an even more important role in this study of desire.
Socrates recognizes lawlessness in some unnecessary desires and pleasures that
are found in the appetitive part of the soul (571b4-5). These desires exist in most people
(571b5). However, such desires usually only manifest themselves in sleep, even in the
case of the democratic man, the penultimate worst man. A few people are said to have
eliminated unnecessary desires entirely, or to have only a few weak desires (571b6-8).
However, the tyrant‘s supporters encourage him to act on his lawless, unnecessary desires
calling this ‗total freedom‘ [ἐλευθερία ἅπασαν].96 Thus, the tyrant begins to grow a
―powerful erotic love, like a great winged drone, to be the leader of those idle desires‖
(572e5-6). As tyranny sets in, the tyrant expels any beliefs or desires that are thought to
be good [χρηστάς] or that still have some shame [ἐπαισχυνομένας] so that the lawless
desires take over his soul (573b1-3). As a result, the tyrant goes mad because these
lawless desires are devoid of rationality.
Plato uses language of slavery when describing the awakening of the lawless
desires in the tyrant:
erotic love lives like a tyrant within him, in complete anarchy and lawlessness as
his sole ruler, and drives him, as if he were a city, to dare anything and provide
sustenance for itself and the unruly mob around it (some of whose members have
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come in from outside as a result of his keeping bad company, while others have
come from within, freed [ἐλευθερωθέντα ] and let loose by his own bad habits).
(574e6-575a5)
Thus, this erotic love becomes the tyrant within the tyrant, taking over his soul so that it
drives his actions. 97
In contrast to democracy‘s blind equality, tyranny creates an artificial inequality
based solely upon the tyrant‘s power to enslave the population. The tyrant is morally
unworthy of his position of power. Because the tyrant is an illegitimate ruler who rules
only by force, without the good will of his subjects, the tyrant‘s freedom is unstable. In
fact, Plato claims that the tyrant has the least freedom in the tyrannical city. After his
description of the tyrannical state in the Republic, Socrates asks Glaucon if such a city is
free or enslaved. Glaucon replies, ―It is as enslaved as it is possible to be [μάλιστα
δούλην].‖ ―Yet,‖ Socrates continues, ―you see in it people who are masters and free [ἐν
αὐτῇ δεσπότας καί ἐλευθέρους].‖ ―I do see a few like that,‖ says Glaucon, ―but the
whole city, so to speak, and the most decent part of it are wretched, dishonored slaves
[δοῦλον]‖ (577c5-10). Socrates presses the analogy to show his interlocutors that even
though it appears as though the tyrant has the most freedom of all, he is psychologically
enslaved because the most decent parts of his soul are enslaved, while the small but
maddest and most vicious part is his master.98 The entire soul is said to be enslaved and
least likely to pursue its desires, instead being ―forcibly driven by the stings of a dronish
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gadfly‖ (577d11-12). The tyrant is said to be ―full of disorder and regret‖ (577e1). Thus,
Plato paints a picture of a tortured tyrant unable to pursue his desires to the fullest
because he is experiencing lawlessness and discord within his soul.
Plato determines that a proper assessment of the tyrant‘s freedom takes into
account his whole soul. An assessment of freedom pertains not simply in whether some
aspect of the agent is acting to fulfill his desires, but rather whether the reasoning part of
the soul is directing the actions of the soul. Ultimately, we shall see that only the soul
ruled by the highest element, reason, is free in this new sense. With these clarifications,
Plato is shifting from a more crude form of freedom towards a nuanced, psycho-ethical
approach to assessing freedom.
Thus, Plato recognizes that the tyrant is free in the crude sense of having the
power to satisfy his base desires. However, these desires are irrational and even
contradictory, thereby limiting his freedom to be a rational agent, ultimately. The tyrant‘s
condition is compared to a kind of prison ―filled with fears and erotic loves of all kinds‖
(579b4-5), ―just like an exhausted body without any self-control‖ (579c7-8). Plato
summarizes the tyrant‘s lack of freedom as follows:
In truth, then, and whatever some people may think, a real tyrant is really a slave,
compelled to engage in the worst kind of fawning, slavery, and pandering to the
worst kind of people. He‘s so far from satisfying his desires in any way that it is
clear—if one happens to know that one must study his whole soul—that he‘s in
the greatest need of most things and truly poor. And . . . he‘s full of fear,
convulsions, and pains throughout his life‖ (579d8-e5).
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Thus, Plato also denies the notion that the tyrant has complete political freedom by
appealing to his tripartite psychology to show that freedom requires rationality. 99 The
irrationality of the lower desires leads to lawless action and instability, which is
antithetical to the peace and security that should accompany freedom.
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3. “Virtue Knows no Master”: Ethical Freedom
in the Myth of Er
The Myth of Er at the end of the Republic presents an intricate interplay between
the roles of freedom, responsibility, necessity and chance in its treatment of
transmigration of souls, choice of new lives, and posthumous reward and punishment.
However, the myth has not always been recognized for its groundbreaking treatment of
the problem of freedom. 100 Annas famously calls the myth childish, vulgar and
ultimately depressing in what she sees as its indifference to the individual‘s fate.101
Halliwell calls the myth ―philosophically incomplete‖ and concludes that it defies
interpretation as truth, fiction or allegory, entirely. 102 I argue that the myth of Er is a key
to understanding Plato‘s doctrine of freedom. In what is said and what is conspicuously
left unsaid, Plato reiterates his argument that the best and freest way to live is the
philosophical life.
Through the myth, Socrates tells the story of a man, named Er, who died in a war
and was revived after twelve days to be a messenger to human beings. 103 He begins the
tale by mentioning that "It isn't, however, a tale of Alcinous 104 that I'll tell you but that of
a brave Pamphylian man [son of Armenius] 105 called Er" (614b). There may be some
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wordplay in effect here that would render the sentence as follows: "It isn't a tale that
shows strength of understanding that I'm going to tell but one that shows the strength of
the Muse of storytelling."106 This meaning could imply that the story is not to be taken
literally, on account of being a myth. On the other hand, the invocation of the Muse may
suggest divine inspiration, giving the myth more credibility. 107
In the myth, Er travels with the rest of the newly dead to arrive at a "marvellous
place" where they encounter souls about to enter new earthly lives. 108 After the
dispensing of rewards and punishments, those who will return to earth again for another
incarnation take a journey to a column of light from which hangs the spindle of Necessity
[ἀνάγκης]. Er is told by the afterlife judges that he was "to be a messenger [ἄγγελον] to
human beings about the things that were there." (614d)
Next, the souls arrive at the three Fates, where souls are arranged in order and the
lots for choosing one‘s next life are thrown among them. Each soul picks up the lot that
fell next to him to determine the order of choosing. Each person chooses the life "to
which he will then be bound by necessity [ἀνάγκης]" (617e1-2). The group is told that
they are completely responsible for their choice of life. There are more lives than souls
present. Each person, no matter his position in the lottery, will at minimum have the
choice of a satisfactory [ἀγαπητός], and not bad [οὐ κακός], life. It is noted that ―the
106
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arrangement of the soul was not included because the soul is inevitably altered by the
different lives it chooses‖ (618b2-4). Thus, the choice of life will determine the
arrangement of the soul in that life.
Socrates says that there is an interchange of goods and evils for most souls. Those
coming down from heaven are untrained in suffering [πόνυν ἀγςμνάζηοςρ], in contrast to
the souls coming up from the earth. Thus, the souls coming from heaven tend to rush
their selections. The souls coming up from below choose more carefully since they wish
to avoid the suffering that they have experienced so recently. We are told that ―For the
most part, their choice depended upon the character 109 [συνήθειαν] of their former life‖
(620a2).
a. The Tyrant‟s „Luck‟
Plato bookends his description of the life selection process with two opposing
figures. The first soul chooses tyranny, while the final soul chooses a just life. The
prominence and order of these choices serve to highlight them as worst and best choices.
Both descriptions are relevant to a discussion of Platonic freedom. The first soul that
receives the lot to choose his new life represents the crude conception of freedom as the
ability to follow any desires unhindered. He has choices of lives ―of all kinds‖ available
to him. He has the tyrant‘s unbridled power to choose whichever kind of life he wishes,
with the option to satisfy any of his desires. It is significant that this first soul to choose
makes the worst possible choice—the greatest tyranny. Thus, the Speaker‘s speech prior
to choosing becomes immediately relevant, and perhaps prophetic: ―There is a
109
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satisfactory [ἀγαπητός] life, rather than a bad one [οὐ κακός] available even for the one
who comes last, provided that he chooses it rationally . . . Therefore, let not the first be
careless [ἀμελείτω] in his choice nor the last discouraged [ἀθυμείτω]‖ (619b3-6).110
Even with this caution the first chooser picks the most ethically repugnant life, while the
final chooser, Odysseus, picks a quintessentially just life. Since the former chose without
adequate examination [ἀναζκετάμενον] through folly [ἀφροσύνης] and greed
[λαιμαργίας] the soon-to-be-tyrant discovers, after making his choice, that his new life
will involve eating his own children (619b8-9).111 Plato gives a further explanation for
the soul‘s poor choice: ―He was one of those who had come down from heaven, having
lived his previous life under an orderly constitution, where he had participated in virtue
through habit and without philosophy [ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα]‖
(619c5-7).
Although Er holds the soul responsible for his own choice, the soul attributes his
terrible choice to ―chance [τύχη], daimons, or guardian spirits, and everything else . . .
but himself‖ (619c3-5). Er reiterates that he ignored the warning about carelessness by
the Speaker (619c3), thus confirming that the soul was in fact responsible for his own
choice. However, the soul‘s addition of chance as a possible cause of his own bad choice
is interesting because chance is often used as an explanatory factor within human life.
Yet according to the myth, much of what humans put forward as resulting from chance—
including life circumstances—is in fact the result of our own choices at some time.
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By contrast, a philosopher would have known that choosing to become a tyrant
would have terrible consequences, especially for the inner state of the soul. For as Plato
shows in Book 9, the tyrant is governed by lawless and unnecessary appetites. As such,
the tyrant will behave in lawless and licentious ways. Thus from the philosopher‘s
perspective it is unsurprising that the choice of the tyrant‘s life might lead to acts such as
eating one‘s children. Tyranny entails the commission of such violent acts. The soul
himself only regrets his choice after learning about some of the abhorrent acts he would
commit. He did not fully understand the consequences of tyranny, as a philosopher might,
and he was overtaken by the riches and power that he would have. The description of his
choice as being made in folly and greed suggests both. Thus, by discounting chance as a
possible explanation for life circumstances, Plato points to a causal ethical link between
the state of the soul, his past experiences, and his choice of new life. Likewise, daimons
and guardian spirits should not be blamed for the result of the soul‘s choice since the
Fates state that they too are chosen by the soul (620d7).
When the realization of all aspects of his new life began to sink in, the soon-to-betyrant ―beat his breast [κόπτεσθαι] and bemoaned his choice‖ (619c1-3).112 Plato
indicates that regret over hasty decisions is common among many souls (619b7-d2). The
first soul‘s reaction to learning more about his new life is irrational and purely emotional.
Instead of using wise calculation to plan how he might mitigate the effect of some of the
112
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terrible acts on his soul, he simply wallows in his choice. His reaction further strengthens
the lower parts of the soul, thus ensuring an even worse life as a tyrant from the ethical
standpoint. If he had taken the route advocated by Socrates at 605d6-7 to ―keep quiet and
master our grief‖ he would have improved the state of his soul before his foray into the
tyrannical life. However, in preparation for the chosen life the soul must be altered so it is
driven by the appropriate desires, whether they are appetitive, spirited or philosophical. 113
Tyranny requires strong desires of the unnecessary appetites. The presence of these
desires may block the tyrant‘s ability to react philosophically to his situation.
The tyrant‘s afterlife punishments were mentioned in the myth before the first
soul chooses, so the reader knows what the end result of this choice will be. Tyrants are
shown to suffer in the afterlife in addition to suffering for their actions in life. The latter
point was made in Book 9 by arguing that the soul of the tyrant comes to be ruled by
lawless and unnecessary desires, making him a prisoner of his own appetites (577d). As I
showed above in the section on tyrants, they embody the crude conception of freedom as
unconstrained choice. Here, again, Plato uses the tyrant as an extreme example of
freedom misconstrued. The myth confirms the terrible consequences of holding the
wrong beliefs about freedom. The tyrant‘s belief that freedom is unrestrained submission
to the desires of one‘s lower soul leads to terrible consequences that further enslave the
tyrant to his lower desires rather than making the soul more free. The philosopher fares
better in the afterlife as well as in embodied life by holding to his rationality and retaining
control over his actions.
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Plato acknowledges that a person may live a virtuous life through habit and
compulsion to obey laws. Such a person will be rewarded in the afterlife for living a
virtuous life (619c5-7). However, the myth confirms the view stated earlier in the
Republic that it is best to be self-governing so that one moderates one‘s choices oneself,
instead of having one‘s activities regulated from without through laws, customs, or habits
(590d2-4).114 The first soul choosing illustrates the latter deficient form of virtue. For he
lived a life of virtue through habit but without philosophy (619c6-7). This soul is
rewarded in the afterlife for his virtuous behavior. However, living the life of virtue
through habit does not stand the soul in good stead for choosing the next life because he
does not fully understand the value of living a life of virtue. He lived virtuously due to
the external incentives of reward and avoidance of punishment by abiding by the laws of
his city. Therefore, he did not have a rational understanding of virtue and its intrinsic
value. Hence, this soul ends up choosing to become a tyrant in the next life because he is
charmed by the tyrant‘s absolute ability to follow any of his desires.
Plato seeks to show that his hedonistic focus on pursuing desires fails to recognize
that only some of the soul‘s desires are worthy of pursuit. The pursuit of the reasoning
part‘s desires should be the focus of the soul. Thus, Plato wishes to introduce an ethical
element into the concept of freedom. In this revised concept of freedom one is free when
pursuing the desires of the highest part of the soul, so that the reasoning part rules the
soul. Plato sees these as the true desires of the soul, but also as the appropriate desires
one should have. Thus, Platonic freedom is a normative concept.
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b. Odysseus‟ Choice
The very last soul to choose in the selection of new lives is Odysseus‘. Odysseus
is poised to represent wise choice in the afterlife. His choice is contrasted with all the
other choices in that it embodies Plato‘s ideal use of reason. Odysseus‘ process of life
selection is described as follows:
. . . since memory of [his soul‘s] former sufferings had relieved [λελωφηκυῖαν]
its love of honor [φιλοτιμίας], it went around for a long time, looking for the life
of a private individual who did his own work, and with difficulty it found one
lying off somewhere neglected by the others. He chose it gladly and said that he‘d
have made the same choice even if he‘d been first. (620c3-d1)
Odysseus‘ choice emphasizes the point made twice in the myth that there are more model
lives to be chosen than souls to choose them (617e9-618a1, 619b3-6). This underscores
the souls‘ choice of lives as unconstrained by external factors. For if there were an equal
number of souls and life choices, the later choices would be severely limited and the final
choice would be determined as there would only be one life left to ―choose‖. Thus, even
though Odysseus receives the last lot, he makes a prudent and happy choice. He takes his
time to consider the remaining options and persists until he finds a suitable life. His full
satisfaction of his former desire for honor in his previous incarnation now permits his
rational soul to guide his decision-making. Now reason, rather than love of honor, drives
his choice, allowing for truly free choice since the rational element of the soul is the
soul‘s natural ruler (441e3). When the rational element is in its natural place as ruler of
the soul, the chooser is able to choose freely, without the impediment of the lower soul‘s
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desires. Thus, he is able to act in line with the rational part‘s desires, which are aligned
with the Good. Choosing well is thereby equated with choosing rationally.
Indeed, the Speaker emphasizes rationality when he tells the souls that they all,
even the last to choose, will find a satisfactory life if they ―choose it rationally and live it
seriously [νῷ ἑλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι]‖ (619b4-5). Thus, a first hurdle is overcome
by making a rational choice. However, the second hurdle is overcome by living the life
seriously. Hence care must be taken in the choice of life, but also in the living of the
chosen life. This second necessary condition precludes determinism or fatalism because it
implies that souls retain some choice in how they live out the life they are born into.
Thus, there are some pre-determined components of life, such as major life events,
profession, and family. As was discussed with the first soul‘s choice of tyranny, some life
events that are thought of as choices are in fact predetermined by the soul‘s choices,
according to the myth. However, souls maintain flexibility in other aspects of life. Hence,
the myth shows a connection between afterlife decision-making and choices made during
life. This makes the myth immediately applicable to its readers, whose current choices
can prepare the soul for its afterlife decisions.
The myth states that external and material circumstances such as wealth, health
and ancestry are part of the life models. However, the arrangement of the soul is not
included in the choice because the soul itself is altered by whichever life it chooses. If the
soul were included in the choice, this would pose a problem for the already tenuous sense
of personhood for the entity choosing because the old soul would be replaced entirely by
the new soul. Additionally, it would raise the question of where the old soul goes,
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especially since Platonic souls are eternal. The fact that the choice of new life has an
immediate impact on the soul‘s makeup allows for some continuity of the person and for
the new choice to be part of the history of previous choices already making up the
person‘s soul. However, it is odd that Plato only mentions recall of the previous life or
even only the previous afterlife experience of reward and punishment. Non-philosophical
souls are depicted as having relatively short memories even though they have had many
previous lives and afterlife interludes.
Odysseus‘ past life plays a part in his choice of a private life. His story depicts the
use of past experiences in a reflective, rational way as opposed to making choices with a
focus on avoiding past painful or pleasurable experiences, as many of the other souls do.
The hedonistic approach of most souls will cause souls to regress, in effect, by choosing
lives that will hamper the practice of virtue. All of the other life choice examples that
Plato gives in the myth are of this sort.115 These ―pitiful, funny and surprising‖ scenes of
souls choosing hedonistically suggest that Plato is criticizing traditional eschatology‘s
heavy focus on reward and punishment.116
Odysseus represents the ideal chooser because he makes his choice by employing
the rational, best part of his soul. His choice of ―a private individual who did his own
work‖ (620c5) exemplifies Plato‘s earlier description of noble, philosophical people who
―lead a quiet life and do their own work‖ (469d5). This also matches the description of
justice earlier on as ―doing one‘s own work and not meddling with what isn‘t one‘s own‖
115
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(433a8-9). Odysseus illustrates that the life devoted to honor and heroism does not lead to
happiness. Given the opportunity to choose such a life again, Odysseus decides
differently and is happy with his choice. The suffering Odysseus experienced in his
previous life relieved him of his honor-love and taught him the value of the life of a
private individual who does his own work.117 Odysseus‘ story may also be meant to
show that love of honor must be spent before it can be subdued fully. 118 His soul seems
to be progressing according to its natural order, from second-best spiritedness towards the
philosophical life. Odysseus, like Er, has lived a spirited life that now allows him to be
receptive to philosophy.
Overall, the function of Odysseus in the myth may be to indicate that the myth is
a philosophical revision of the Odyssey, where the perilous quest for home is replaced by
the immortal soul‘s quest for eternal happiness. 119 Odysseus‘s new destination is
wisdom. However, it is odd that Plato does not mention philosophy in his description of
the model life chosen by Odysseus, even though we can infer that this is a philosophical
choice by the description of Odysseus‘s manner of choosing his life. Odysseus knew in
advance the type of life he wanted—―the life of a private individual who did his own
work.‖ His determination to find this life corresponds to Socrates‘ prescription for
choosing a good life:
each of us must . . . be most concerned to seek out and learn those [subjects] that
will enable him to distinguish the good life from the bad and always to make the
best choice possible in every situation . . . And from all this he will be able, by
117
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considering the nature of the soul, to reason out which life is better and which
worse and to choose accordingly, calling a life worse if it leads the soul to become
more unjust, better if it leads the soul to become more just, and ignoring
everything else . . . Hence, we must go down to Hades holding with adamantine
determination to the belief that this is so, lest we be dazzled there by wealth and
other such evils, rush into tyranny or some other similar course of action, do
irreparable evils, and suffer even worse ones . . . This is the way that a human
being becomes happiest. (618b8-619b1)
Odysseus deftly avoids the pitfalls of the other souls by aiming for a fulfilling life by
persevering until he finds it, without allowing himself to be distracted by all the other life
models before him. Further, he exemplifies the freedom of reason ruling the soul in line
with the Good. For in order to remain true to his decision to choose a just life, he has
subdued the influence of the other two parts of the soul so that he may cling to his
decision ―with adamantine determination.‖ The other souls‘ choices are driven by their
lower souls‘ desires. Plato does not state that Odysseus has studied philosophy. However,
it seems to be implied that one must undergo such study or reflection to be able to choose
well, as Odysseus does. In addition, Odysseus has been exposed to many types of lives
throughout his vast travels, an important factor that conforms to Socrates‘ prescription for
choosing the good life, above. Memory of his previous suffering (620c3) also plays a role
in his choice.
There are no philosophers mentioned explicitly in the lineup of souls choosing.
One reason may be that philosophers escape the cycle of rebirth ultimately if they
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continue to pursue philosophy. 120 A second possibility is that Odysseus is meant to
represent the beginning of the philosophical path once spirit has been subdued or spent.121
Odysseus may simply be symbolic of the choices requisite for philosophical ascent to the
Good, without being a literal representation of the actual steps required for ascent. It is
significant that Odysseus is the only soul who is mentioned as happy with the new life
that he has chosen, especially considering that he was the last soul to choose.122 The wise
choice of Odysseus stands up to later scrutiny, while the poor choices of the slavishly
virtuous do not.
c. Reward, Punishment and Responsibility
The myth of Er confirms the value of the just life by including the afterlife
rewards of the just. One purpose of the myth is to convey the ―prizes, wages and gifts‖
that the just receive in the afterlife (613e5-614a6). Er learns that the unjust are punished
"ten times over", while the just are ―rewarded according to the same scale" (615a-b).
Thus, the myth is a philosophical revision of childhood stories about afterlife punishment
and reward that are alluded to in Book 1 by Cephalus. 123 The myth can be seen as a
critique of traditional eschatologies which focus on reward and punishment as
inducements to good behavior.124 Although reward and punishment are mentioned in the
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myth, they are not the focus. 125 The Er myth emphasizes that the philosopher‘s main goal
should not be the pursuit of rewards and avoidance of punishment, but rather the care of
the soul. Care of the soul entails always seeking out the Forms, or situating oneself so
that one may best understand the Forms, which are the ultimate reality and truth. The
philosopher must continue philosophizing after death in order to make the best possible
choice of future lives. This continued philosophical activity in the afterlife in turn
supports the rational part‘s rightful dominance of the soul. Through reason‘s wise choices
the soul will be able to study philosophy in the future. Heaven is no place for resting on
past philosophical achievements. The philosopher must continue to pursue the truth
actively in order to ensure continued safety for the soul.
The myth makes clear that the choosing soul alone is to be held responsible for its
choice of life: ―The responsibility [αἰτία] lies with the one who makes the choice; the
god has none [θεός ἀναίτιος]‖ (617e3-4). Thus, Plato states explicitly that the gods are
not responsible for the souls‘ choices. However, the absence of divine influence on the
choice does not necessarily make the choice free for Plato. Rather, the choice is
determined by whichever part of the soul is most dominant, by how large a role reason
plays, by the values of the soul, with regard to past experiences and knowledge of how
specific lifestyles affect the soul. All of these elements influencing the soul‘s choice
make the soul responsible for its choices because they causally connect past events to the
soul‘s future events. Thus, the soul deserves whichever new life it chooses based upon its
current composition. The life selection reveals the values of the soul at the time of
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choosing, particularly whether it values conditions conducive to practicing philosophy.
For instance, the choice to become an animal will immediately preclude the possibility of
practicing philosophy, and would embolden the appetitive part of the soul. Hence,
Socrates implores his interlocutors to focus their learning on subjects that will allow them
to distinguish the good life from the bad at any point in time.
However, for most souls, who are also not philosophers, the choice of a new life
is not an expression of the truest self, which is the rational part of the soul (611d). Most
souls operate to fulfill the desires of spirit or appetite. Thus, in a crude sense their choices
are free because they are not hindered by any forces outside of themselves. However,
from the point of view of Platonic psychology, most souls are not free because the
reasoning part is subservient to the lower soul‘s desires. Thus, the bondage comes from
the soul‘s own improper ordering, which again is a result of the way the soul has lived
out his life, as well as his choice of that life prior to incarnation. Hence, we are told that
―the arrangement of the soul was not included because the soul is inevitably altered by
the different lives it chooses‖ (618b2-4). The relationship between the choices that the
soul makes and the soul‘s arrangement is one of causal determinism. For specific actions
create specific changes in the soul‘s composition. Thus, since a form of determinism is
present alongside Plato‘s concept of freedom, he can be properly labeled a
compatibilist.126
The myth of Er shows that individual souls possess continuity between lifetimes.
The souls depicted retain their experiences of life just lived and use these experiences in
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choosing the subsequent life. The experiences and choices in life affect the choice of the
next life and the opportunities within that next life. 127 Even though the outward
appearance and circumstances may change drastically from one life to the next, the soul‘s
makeup is constantly evolving, while at the same time it is united from one experience or
life to the next. However, the soul does not remember anything prior to its birth if it
drinks too much from the River of Unheeding before being born again.
Thayer asserts that there is no ―living link‖ between the succession of lives of a
particular soul. 128 Likewise, Annas expresses concern that souls suffer the consequences
for behavior in past lives that they cannot remember.129 While I agree that there is
generally no memory of what has occurred before birth, there is a link between the
immediate past life and the soul choosing in the afterlife. The point of Plato‘s story of
transmigration of souls is that one‘s choices have consequences, sometimes very longlasting and damning consequences. The corollary that the reader is to draw is that all
choices are important determinants of one‘s future, whether the choice is made in life or
in the afterlife. The myth highlights Plato‘s contention that choosing to study and live a
philosophical life is beneficial to one‘s future psychological well-being, in this life and
beyond. 130 Further, the fact that souls do not remember previous lives after birth speaks
to the interconnectedness of all souls in the universe. Just because the present ―I‖ will not
be remembered as the ―I‖ of the next life, this does not give me permission to bungle my
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choice of future life. Even if I will not recall that I made the choice to become a tyrant in
this life, I will still be gravely affected by that choice made in the afterlife, just as the men
that I will enslave as a tyrant will be affected negatively by my actions, though they are
separate entities from me. Plato‘s point is that all actions are choices and they matter to
our own souls and to other souls.
d. Immortality and the Tripartite Soul
The non-philosophical souls in the myth display traits of the spirited and
appetitive souls in the afterlife. They use reason solely to calculate how to achieve the
desires of these lower parts of the soul. Hence, Plato‘s portrayal of the afterlife in the
myth suggests that the lower parts of the soul can survive physical death, along with the
reasoning part. This squares with the tripartite image used for disembodied souls in the
eschatological myth of the Phaedrus. 131 However, the Timaeus offers a more complex
picture of the soul. It states that there are mortal and immortal parts of the soul (69c8-9).
This description has produced controversy about how the mortal and immortal soul parts
are paired with the body.132 Further, some take the Timaeus passage as proof of Plato‘s
developmentalism, 133 while others argue that it is consistent with his earlier views. 134
Perhaps the discrepancies between the Timaeus on the one hand and the Phaedrus
and the Republic on the other can be resolved by consideration of the term ‗mortal‘
131
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[θνητός] which is applied to the lower soul parts. The human soul is created with a
mortal element so as to distinguish it from the gods, whose souls are entirely immortal.
However, the mortality of the lower soul may not coincide with the mortality of the
human being.135 Plato may have seen the mortal soul as persisting until the eventual
release from the cycles of death and rebirth. 136 In this way, the lower soul is labeled
mortal in the sense of being liable to death, even though this death may not coincide with
the biological death of the human being. 137 In such a scheme, the individual would retain
his lower soul in the afterlife until its potential release. This explains the actions of souls
in the Republic myth, which exemplify the proclivities of the lower soul. This
interpretation of the soul‘s mortality also explains the use of reward and punishment for
souls in the afterlife. For the philosophical soul will not be greatly affected by reward or
punishment. Souls with overdeveloped spirit or appetite will respond most strongly to
reward and punishment. Hence, reward and punishment is part of a system most
applicable to these latter types of souls.
e. Freedom and Virtue
The traditional system of eschatological reward and punishment is not based upon
discerning virtuous intention, but only virtuous action. Thus, the first soul choosing was
rewarded in the afterlife because he was virtuous, irrespective of the reason why he
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behaved this way. 138 On the face of it this soul‘s fate smacks of cosmic cruelty, as
commentators have noted.139 Why does the universe allow a soul to be rewarded for just
behavior, but then be vulnerable to making a poor choice of life? Plato‘s message seems
to be that hedonistic external rewards, even the heavenly rewards of traditional
eschatology, are in some sense meaningless and do not contribute to the soul‘s wellbeing. In fact, such rewards can hinder future just behavior. 140 However, this perspective
does give a negative view of divine reward and punishment. This cosmos is purely
consequentialist and disregards character, intention and the composition of the soul.
Perhaps this depiction of reward and punishment is part of Plato‘s overarching critique of
traditional religion.
The myth of Er sets up two parallel tracks of ethical systems: the consequentialist
cosmic system of reward and punishment and the virtue ethics of the Good. It is only
through the latter that one may attain lasting freedom. The ethical component of Platonic
freedom is expressed in the statement by the Speaker before the souls choose their lives.
He says, ―Virtue knows no master; each will possess it to a greater or less degree,
depending on whether he values it or disdains it. The responsibility lies with the one who
makes the choice; the god has none‖ (617e2-4). It is through choosing virtue that one
gains freedom. By grounding one‘s choices in virtue, with a full understanding of virtue,
one escapes the vicissitudes of a life lived for reward and avoidance of punishment. For
the focus of the consequentialist ethics depicted is attainment of pleasure, which is a

138

One wonders whether a person with virtuous intentions would be punished for an non-virtuous action by
the gods of traditional religion postmortem. It seems that he would be.
139
Annas 1981, 351-2.
140
Cf. Phaedo 82a-b. See Halliwell 2007, 452.

70

transient good, whereas the focus of Plato‘s virtue ethics is the instantiation of the Good
through action, which provides lasting good.
Talk of the Forms themselves is conspicuously absent in the myth. Plato spends
time describing astonishing Pythagorean-laced scenes of the inner workings of the
universe. Interestingly, these scenes focus heavily on the personification of Necessity in
the cosmos and the actions of the Fates. All of this deterministic talk precedes the
selection of lives, which marks the opportunity for souls to make use of their rationality
to freely choose their subsequent lives. However, most souls do not exercise their rational
freedom due to the pressures of their undisciplined lower desires. Thus, the lack of
mention of Forms in the myth befits the fact that most souls are unphilosophical.
f. The Moral of the Myth
Socrates' explicit purpose in telling the Myth of Er is to convince his friends that
the benefits of being just gained after death, in addition to those received during life,
outweigh the advantages of being unjust. However, the example of the first chooser
distinguishes between just action undertaken because of an understanding of its intrinsic
value and just action carried out with ignorance of the value of justice. Thus, Bloom takes
one sense of the Myth of Er to be merely reiterating the message of the rest of the work
about the necessity and superiority of philosophy. 141 For the philosopher ends up in
closest proximity to the Forms both in life and in the afterlife, even though the Forms are
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not mentioned in this particular myth.142 Further, the philosopher‘s rationality protects
her from making poor choices that would negatively affect her in the future.
At the end of the myth, and the end of The Republic, Socrates gives a further
indication of his intention in telling the myth:
And so, Glaucon, [Er‘s] story wasn‘t lost but preserved, and it would save us, if
we were persuaded by it, for we would then make a good crossing of the River of
Forgetfulness, and our souls wouldn‘t be defiled. But if we are persuaded by me,
we‘ll believe that the soul is immortal and able to endure every evil and every
good, and we‘ll always hold to the upward path, practicing justice and reason in
every way. (621b-c)
The first scenario mentioned here suggests that the myth provides a blueprint for making
a good crossing of the River of Heedlessness. By heeding the gravity of the punishments
and the caution that we may lose some of our knowledge 143 gained in the afterlife by
drinking from the river, we may resist drinking too much and thus remember more.
Although retention of knowledge is implied by this interpretation, this is a
consequentialist interpretation of the myth that is more akin to the virtuous action by
habit of the first soul choosing. For one would act in a way to avoid defiling the soul and
to make a good crossing essentially to avoid pain of punishment.
The second scenario‘s focus on being persuaded by argument suggests a more
philosophical understanding of the afterlife. Heeding Socrates‘ arguments throughout the
Republic yields one eternal protection through all life and death cycles. For, on the one
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hand, the simple recognition of the immortality of the soul enables one to hold a bigpicture, cosmic view of any situation, giving one the knowledge that any unpleasant
situation is impermanent and that any enjoyable circumstances will likely be subject to
change in the future. This knowledge of the fluctuations of pleasure and pain steels the
philosopher from allowing avoidance of pain and pursuance of pleasure to drive her
actions. Instead, the philosopher can focus on knowing the Forms through living justly
with an understanding of the intrinsic worth of justice and ultimately the Good. 144 Thus,
I interpret the above passage as suggesting two paths of virtue: virtue imposed from
without (through threat of punishment) and philosophical virtue pursued for its own sake.
These two paths are the only paths available if the just city outlined in the Republic
comes into effect.
g. Choice
Socrates uses the idea of choosing one‘s next life to highlight the importance of
the study of the good life as a science, 145 so that we may know how each factor presented
will impact one‘s life:
each of us must neglect all other subjects and be most concerned to seek out and
learn those that will enable him to distinguish the good life from the bad and
always to make the best choice possible in every situation. He should think over
all the things we have mentioned and how they jointly and severally determine
what the virtuous life is like. That way he will know what the good and bad
144
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effects of beauty are when it is mixed with wealth, poverty, and a particular state
of the soul. He will know the effects of high or low birth, private life or ruling
office, physical strength or weaknesses, ease or difficulty in learning, and all the
things that are either naturally part of the soul or are acquired, and he will know
what they achieve when mixed with one another. And from all this he will be
able, by considering the nature of the soul, to reason out which life is better and
which worse and to choose accordingly, calling a life worse if it leads the soul to
become more unjust, better if it leads the soul to become more just, and ignoring
everything else: We have seen that this is the best way to choose, whether in life
or death. (618b8-e3)
The final line of this passage tells us that Socrates intends the myth to apply to embodied
life as well as to the afterlife. Thus, philosophical study of the virtuous life will help a
soul initially to choose a good life in the afterworld, but the knowledge gained can be
applied immediately in the current life, as well. Just as the macroscopic view of the city
encouraged a radical shift in government in line with the truth, so too on the more
microscopic human scale Plato is encouraging radical change if it will bring souls closer
to the truth. Socrates‘ own life is an example of single-mindedly following wisdom
wherever the search for wisdom takes you, regardless of any pain endured.
The description of transmigration of souls, so prominent in the myth, provides a
symbolic rebirth for the reader who lives through an inter-life cycle as she reads the
myth. In experiencing the journey of the soul the reader also experiences the purification
that happens after death, thus allowing her to begin her life afresh after her encounter
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with the Republic.146 The reader is allowed to clean her slate of her past actions in the
current life and given permission to live her life anew, as though it is an entirely new life.
The reader has been purified of her previous bad actions. This allows the astute reader to
begin to live a life according to the new Platonic freedom, which entails action in line
with reason and the Good. Having been made aware of the pitfalls of the desires of the
lower soul, the reader can now pursue a more philosophical existence. If we interpret the
myth in this way, the focus is on the factors that humans can control rather than the
factors we cannot or that result from previous choices. 147
While it is true that all souls given the opportunity to choose a life do in fact make
a choice, this does not equate to freedom in Plato‘s view. The myth suggests the
possibility of varying levels of freedom for each soul. For instance, the soul who chooses
the life of the tyrant has in the crude sense chosen freely, in that it is made clear that the
choice is made by the soul alone without external influence of the gods (617e3-4). In the
Platonic sense of freedom the soul‘s choice is constrained by the desires of his lower
soul, which are not checked by his rationality. Thus, Plato shows that even though there
may not be any external constraints on choice, actions are not fully free unless they are
chosen through wise exercise of rationality imbued with virtue. This first soul has further
limited his true freedom because of his faulty definition of freedom.148 This soul‘s choice
of life being made in the afterlife parallels the situation of the tyrant within life. For this
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first soul to choose a life has every possible life type in front of him, just as the tyrant can
do anything he wishes in life because of his absolute power.
Philosophers may also feel the initial tug of the lower soul in circumstances of
temptation. However, the difference is that, having fully developed rational faculties,
they know how to resist such immediate impulses. A choice in any direction aside from
virtue is a choice towards the unknown that may gravely imperil one‘s soul. For the lower
parts of the soul are unstable and unpredictable, leading one to a life of indeterminism. In
this sense, choosing a virtuous life is a pragmatic stance as it ensures some stability
against the vagaries of life. Any choice not imbued with virtue is unfree, for Plato.
h. Chance and External Choice Constraints
The fact that only one soul, Odysseus‘, is depicted as making a good choice of
next life may be an indication of Plato‘s pessimism about the majority‘s ability to choose
a virtuous life. 149 Although the apparatus of souls‘ life selection appears to be fair and
unrestricted, the details Plato provides suggest that some external constraints may hinder
the opportunities of the souls choosing. Firstly, the souls have lots thrown in front of
them (617e5). The numbers of the lots in front of the souls determine the order of souls
choosing lives (617e7-8), rather than the souls picking the lots actively themselves. The
Speaker downplays the impact of the lot on the range of life choices saying, ―There is a
satisfactory life rather than a bad one available even for the one who comes last, provided
that he chooses it rationally and lives it seriously‖ (619b3-6). This statement does allow
the possibility that the earlier lots may fare better. However, the description of events that
149

See 494a: "the majority cannot be philosophic."

76

Er witnesses suggests that Plato is pessimistic about the choices most souls make. Some
lines later, Socrates says that there is an interchange of goods and evils for most souls
(619d6). This is due to the souls coming from heaven having no recent experience of
suffering and hence no desire to avoid it, while the souls who had suffered beneath the
earth were eager to avoid suffering in their next go around. The soul‘s recent experience
of pleasure or pain is one reason for the interchange. Thus, most souls are short-sighted
when choosing future lives.
Socrates seems to contradict the Speaker‘s downplaying of the lot when he
includes ―the chance of the lottery [τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην]‖ (619d5) as another
explanation for the interchange of good and evil. Thus, the two factors Socrates mentions
for having a happy life and death are pursuing philosophy and not being one of the last to
choose. Even though there are many more life models than souls choosing, it does seem
possible that if all the souls choosing were philosophers, then perhaps there may not be
any appropriate choices left for a philosophical soul choosing later. Thus, Odysseus‘ case
is interesting to examine, since he is said to be the last soul choosing yet he is depicted as
making the best choice according to the definition of justice laid out in the Republic. In
the case of Odysseus, all the souls mentioned as choosing before him choose poorly. This
enables Odysseus to find a suitable leftover life. However, if the previous souls had
chosen wisely, Odysseus may have been out of luck. Alternatively, the gods may provide
a different set of lives to a group of souls that is all philosophers, so that all may choose
well.
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McPherran questions the impartiality of the Speaker (or Prophet) given that he
may know the outcome of the lots in advance. 150 However, I do not think that divine
foreknowledge of events relieves responsibility from the chooser or that it is incompatible
with having the lots be random. The important point for Plato is that the souls do not
know any outcomes and so must react wisely to the hand they‘ve been dealt. The slew of
available lives is not necessarily random and that is where there could be divine
influence. However, this does not affect the soul‘s responsibility for his choice. Plato
highlights the significance of choices regardless of any known or unknown external limits
imposed on the choices. Every choice has some limitations imposed on it. Souls must use
their current knowledge of a situation, limited or not, to calculate the best choice.
These contradictory presentations of chance may be due to the varying
perspectives of the spectators. Chance may simply be ignorant man‘s interpretation of
events. All of the life elements that the soul chooses in the myth are typically thought to
be given by chance. According to the myth, after the souls drink from the River of
Unheeding, they will forget that they have chosen all of these elements in their lives.
Thus, they will consider gender, social class, family, and genetics to be a matter of
chance. However, the myth emphasizes a deeper order behind the seeming randomness of
human lives. Plato might be suggesting that the idea of chance arises from a limited
perspective so that what appears to be due to chance is actually due to choice or a set of
choices made. In this way, Plato may be aiming to show that we as humans have much
more control than we realize. Socrates‘ conclusion that the chance of the lottery plays a
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role in the outcomes of souls may simply be meant to emphasize human ignorance of the
divine workings of the cosmos. Alternatively, Plato may be prompting the reader to
notice the discrepancy between Socrates‘ and the Speaker‘s statements. By reviewing the
outcome of the last to choose, the reader may judge for himself the importance of the
lottery.
Even the section about the River of Unheeding allows an opportunity for souls to
choose. Here, the souls who use their reason drink only what they must, while the
remainder of souls drink to excess. Presumably, the lighter drinkers will retain some
memory of the Forms and the afterlife. This part of the myth is a poignant reminder of the
use of thirst at 439a-d as an example of a necessary desire of the appetitive part of the
soul. Reason must remain in control of the soul so that it does not drink too much.
However, the souls that are not ruled by reason drink with abandon, regressing in the
journey by erasing some knowledge of the Forms and adding to their ignorance. This will
make it more difficult for them to gain knowledge in their next life.
Socrates also suggests a factor that is more in humans‘ control: studying
philosophy. The path of philosophy that Socrates suggests employs wisdom that will lead
to a good outcome for any soul in a benevolent universe. One may have guessed initially
that Odysseus would have ended up with an undesirable life because he was the last to
choose. However, Plato uses Odysseus to show that by employing reason and intelligent
reflection upon one‘s previous life experiences one may choose well and even choose
best. As Plato says, reason will allow us to endure anything (621c1-4). This interpretation
provides some optimism, in that what matters most is the present choice. What matters in
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the choice of lives is the present choosing and it has great consequences for the future.
However, Plato‘s point is that we are always faced with choices. Yes, previous
experiences and the current state of the soul do affect choices, but the message is that
good choices at any point in the cycle of lives can have a long-lasting positive effect.
Although poor choices are shown abundantly in the myth, they serve to highlight the
single wise choice made by Odysseus. It is easy to choose poorly, but training in
philosophy allows one to choose cautiously, seriously and knowledgeably. Readers are
meant to want to emulate Odysseus, who ends up happy with his new life after a full
examination of all his options.
i. Good and Evil
Why are souls presented with bad life choices by the gods to begin with? Why
are souls given the power to choose their future lives? One benefit of allowing souls to
choose future lives is that it enables a full display of the value of philosophy and
education in virtue. Souls who have pursued wisdom will make better choices, while the
rest of the souls are allowed the opportunity to learn from their mistakes. The souls who
choose poorly will be self-imprisoned by the demands of their lower desires. Presumably,
these souls will begin to seek freedom through virtue. Further, if poor choices are made,
the soul will endure some suffering, which will purify the soul and allow it to make better
choices in the future. For Plato says that the majority of souls coming up from earth were
more cautious in their choices, having seen and undergone much suffering (619d3-5). If
the gods are said to care for humans, this exercise in choosing lives and then living them
out, even if they are very bad lives must serve the universe‘s purposes, which is the
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improvement of the whole.151 The entire apparatus of transmigration must ultimately be
directed to good ends, even if its slow rate of progression of individual souls does seem
depressing to our limited human view, as Annas declares. 152 Her concern that Plato
presents a deterministic world view is alleviated by the option of achieving freedom
through philosophy.
Although the souls are not constrained by external forces in making their choices,
each individual soul will have varying degrees of freedom in his or her choice of life.
Most souls are not capable of making a philosophically sound choice that has the
prerequisites of having studied philosophy, having proper ordering of the soul and
valuing philosophy. Without these factors, souls will choose badly, according to the
myth. These poor choices seem to stem from rash decision-making based upon following
lower desires and from having a limited perspective. For example, Atalanta is seduced by
the honors of a male athlete (620b4-6). In contrast, Odysseus, the ideal chooser, takes his
time to examine all the lives to find the type of life that he believes will be best, given his
previous life experience. Secondly, Odysseus‘s previous life relieved his love of honor so
that his rational faculty‘s desires can now drive his choice. However, Odysseus lived
through an entire life devoted to gaining honor, suggesting that giving in to the spirited
part of the soul may expend its pull and allowing him to arrive at a point where his soul
would welcome a just life. Thus, although souls are not externally constrained in their
choices, many have inherent psychological flaws that will restrict good life choices.
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Hence, non-philosophers experience a deterministic153 relationship between the current
state of their souls and their choices. 154 The philosopher, on the other hand, is free in his
choices. For he knows how to manage any internal constraints that arise by keeping
reason in control of his soul. 618b7-619a2 explains the correct way to prepare for
choosing a life. Given one‘s place in the lottery, Plato‘s normative ethics suggests that
there will be one correct life choice if one‘s rational faculty is being employed to its
utmost capabilities. This results in the paradox of Platonic freedom, that there is a
determinate right action that a Platonically free philosopher should take. Freedom guided
by knowledge of the Good is not a set of random choices or choices based upon lower
desires; rather it is singular right action in a given set of circumstances.
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4. Philosophical Freedom as the Rule of Reason in the Soul
a. The Educational Path Towards Freedom from the Cave
The Republic suggests that freedom can be achieved through a long educational
program which begins by aligning the future philosopher‘s habits with the soul‘s true
rational nature. Although every human being is born with the potential to be free, Plato
shows that freedom is most reliably attained through philosophical education.155 Thus, a
look at the philosopher‘s education provides clues about the character of her freedom. I
show that the moral psychology of the Republic should be taken as the foundation of
Plato‘s philosophy of freedom. The myth of the cave connects the themes of education
and freedom explicitly, providing further insight into the philosopher‘s educational path
to freedom.
i.

The Educational Path to Freedom in the Republic

The education of the guardians in the Republic is a long and arduous process,
whose aim is to produce psychologically harmonious and free individuals ruled by their
own rationality. The formation of guardians is of paramount importance for the city,
since the guardians are demiurges of the city‘s freedom:
Guardians are to be craftsmen of the city‘s freedom [δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας
τῆς πόλεως], and be exclusively that, and do nothing at all except what
contributes to it, they must neither do nor imitate [μιμεῖσθαι] anything else.
(395b6-c2)
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This remarkable passage highlights freedom as the guardians‘ main concern and raison
d’être. The precondition for being a demiurge of the city‘s freedom is that the guardian
must himself be free. Given that guardians are to rule the city, they must first rule their
own souls with reason.156 For, as Socrates states, ―It would be absurd for a guardian to
need a guardian‖ (403e). Mature guardians do not need paternalistic limits set on their
choices. For reason always rules their souls. The guardian ―is the best person both for
himself and for the city‖ (413e4-5). The implication here is that the guardians replicate,
on a political level, the freedom they experience on a psychological level. 157
The proper function of reason is essential to becoming a free guardian. Hence,
early education is geared towards aligning the child‘s soul with reason, so that ―he will
welcome reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its kinship
[οἰκειότητα] with himself‖ (402a). Socrates notes the potential of all to become
educated: ―the power to learn is present in everyone‘s soul and the instrument with
which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light
without turning the whole body [and] the whole soul until it is able to study . . . the good‖
(518c3-d1).158 Thus, education does not involve putting sight, or reason, into the soul,
rather it ―takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn‘t turned the right way or
looking where it ought to look, and tries to redirect it appropriately‖ (518d6-7). Hence,
every soul is capable of freedom through education. Philosophical education encourages
the proper ordering of the soul with reason as its ruler so that individuals act in
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accordance with the Good.
In contrast, Plato explains the plight of the uneducated, and unfree: ―Isn‘t it likely
. . . that they will never adequately govern a city? . . . [They] would fail because they
don‘t have a single goal at which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim‖
(519b6-c2). Thus, the unfree lack what the ruler has: experience of the truth and direction
of all of his actions towards a single goal, the Good. Therefore, education is the process
of aligning the entire soul so that it is able to study the Good and align its actions with it.
All of the soul parts must be aimed at the correct objects of study. 159 Hence, freedom can
be achieved through learned habit.160
As such, young guardians are to be shielded from influences that counter this
educational goal of producing free and freedom-loving guardians. The fear is that young
guardians may imitate unfavorable behavior that they are exposed to. For Plato says that
imitations practiced from youth can be dangerous because they become part of individual
habit [ἔθη] and nature [φύσιν] (395c-d). 161 Hence, Plato specifies the types of
influences young guardians should be exposed to throughout their education, again
naming freedom explicitly as a characteristic of guardians:
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If [guardians] do imitate, they must imitate from childhood what is appropriate to
them, namely, people who are courageous, self-controlled, pious, and free
[ἐλευθέρους], and their actions. (395c2-5) 162
This passage highlighting freedom comes, seemingly paradoxically, amidst the
discussion of censorship of music and poetry in the education of the Guardians. However,
this placement serves to underscore Plato‘s novel view of freedom as reasoned choice in
line with the Good against the view of freedom as the ability to pursue any and all
desires. Platonic freedom is the result of disciplined practice to pursue only the Good.
Thus, censorship helps young souls to become free by shielding them from any possible
influence of negative models of behavior. Plato connects freedom and censorship of
inappropriate stories in Book 3 when he says ―the more poetic they are, the less they
should be heard by children or by men who are supposed163 to be free and to fear slavery
more than death [ἀνδράσιν οὓς δεῖ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, δουλείαν θανάτου μᾶλλον
πεφοβημένους]‖ (387b2-4). Without guidance towards or public endorsement of the
philosophical life, the soul becomes easily distracted by the immediacy of satisfying
lower pleasures. As a result, philosophical life may then be marginalized in favor of
gratifying the increasingly dominant appetitive part of the soul. For the desires of the
lower soul are more immediate and stronger than those of the reasoning element, which
must be trained and developed.164
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The imitation of slavishness by guardians is of particular concern. Guardians are
barred from imitating ―slaves doing slavish things [ὅσα δούλων]‖ (395e3). Slavishness,
to Plato, represents a lack of control over one‘s actions and goals. The slave is at the
mercy of his master‘s wishes, whether the slave agrees with them or not. Further, because
the slave is serving the needs of another, he is not using his rationality in its most natural
function to serve the Good. The slave‘s rationality is working entirely in the service of
the master‘s needs. Thus, Plato correlates slavery in general with inoperative or corrupt
use of rationality. 165 Freedom, in opposition to slavery, entails proper and willing
employment of reason by the soul. For ―nothing taught by force stays in the soul‖ (536e23).
Similarly, educators must guard against lawlessness, which can creep in unnoticed
(424d). Plato explains the threat of lawlessness: ―when lawlessness [παρανομία] has
established itself there, it flows over little by little into characters [τὰ ἤθη] and ways of
life [τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα]. Then, greatly increased, it makes its insolent way into the laws
and government, until in the end it overthrows everything, public and private‖ (424d-e).
Hence, lawlessness is dangerous because it changes the natural order of ruler and ruled,
both for the state and the individual soul. 166 Further, lawlessness is the modus operandi
of the tyrant and is a pseudo-freedom.167 For ultimately, lawlessness prevents directed
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action towards one‘s goals because it encourages too many competing desires to become
prominent in the soul by satisfying them willy-nilly. 168 This contrast of freedom and
lawlessness underscores the fact that freedom is disciplined and consistent action in line
with the Good. The guardian focuses all of her actions towards instantiating the Good.
The contrast of Platonic freedom with amoral lawlessness highlights the ethical and
teleological nature of Plato‘s freedom.
Plato‘s insertion of freedom alongside the qualities of courage, self-control, piety
―and all things of that kind,‖169 provides some room for speculation about the status of
freedom within Plato‘s metaphysical system. 170 Is freedom a virtue or a Form, perhaps?
Courage [ἀνδρείους] and self-control [σώφρονας] comprise two of the four cardinal
virtues (427e4-428a8)171, as well as each having their own Forms along with piety.
Indeed, all of these virtues are referenced in conjunction with freedom and seem to play a
role in freedom. Freedom entails the courage to follow reason, the self-control to be able
to resist the pull of the desires of the lower soul, the just ordering of the soul and the
knowledge of the Good so that one may act on it. However, freedom remains a distinct
concept from all of these virtues. It seems awkward to call freedom a virtue, since it is a
state that allows one to be virtuous. For freedom is the ability to act in line with reason‘s
desire for the Good. Virtue is the result of being free. At a minimum, Plato would likely
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ascribe a Form to freedom, as he does with the other attributes mentioned here. The Form
of freedom would be a high status Form, given that it is coincident with virtue.
ii.

The Freedom of the Good: The Cave Allegory

The allegory of the cave depicts in mythical form the freedom that arises through
proper guardian education.172 It is widely accepted that the cave allegory portrays
education through knowledge of the Forms as liberating. However, I argue that this
theme of liberation points explicitly to a more stringent philosophical concept of
individual metaphysical freedom. The theme of philosopher as free here is a continuation
of what has been said about freedom earlier in the Republic.173 The character of Platonic
freedom remains consistent here, too, as both an ethical and a metaphysical concept.
In the parable, the prisoner‘s freedom comes in stages, just as the educational
program consists in stages. Each successive experience described in the allegory leads to
additional freedom, culminating in the escape from the cave and the ability to look at the
sun, or Good, in itself. Thus, there are levels, or gradations on the path towards freedom.
Further, each stage begins with a sudden shock, perhaps suggestive of a flash of insight.
Within the stages, the experience of understanding and accepting the reality before one is
gradual, as indicated by the period of adjustment required after each transition.
Entry into each of the stages presented in the myth is involuntary in some sense,
given the language that Plato uses.174 The beginning of each stage is unpleasant, initially.
During the first stage of freedom, after the release [λυθείη] from the chains, the prisoner
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is compelled [ἀναγκάζοιτο] to turn around and view the parade of statuary (515d4-7).
Again, he is compelled [ἀναγκάζοι] to look at the firelight, though he wishes to return to
the world he is used to (515e1-2). Finally, he is dragged up out of the cave and into the
sunlight by force [βίᾳ] (515e5-6).
There is much conjecture about the agent that forces the prisoner up and out of the
cave to experience the Reality of the Forms. The agent might be a Socratic teacher.175 It
may be the abstract subjects of study, primarily mathematics, that lead to the Good.176 It
could be the Good itself. 177 In the Symosium and Phaedrus erôs plays a role in the
ascent.178 Finally, in addition to the preceding suggestions, I put forward that the drive to
escape the cave may be the rational soul attempting to wrest control to take its natural
place as ruler.179 This may signify the moment that the philosopher comes to identify
with the reasoning part of her soul and when reason ceases to serve the lower parts of the
soul—the moment the philosopher becomes free and most authentically herself. 180
Plato uses the language of compulsion again when he states that once the
philosopher has seen the Form of the Good, she should be compelled to return to the cave
and rule the city. 181 Although unhindered contemplation of the Forms is the activity
most pleasing to the philosopher,182 Plato makes clear that the ruler‘s goal is not to make
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himself alone outstandingly happy [διαφερόντως εὖ πράξει].183 In Socrates‘ imagined
republic, each class should share the benefits that it can with the rest of the community,
spreading the happiness to everyone as much as possible rather than hoarding it amongst
one class (519e). The maximization of one‘s own happiness is not the goal of those who
have seen the Good, rather it is the maximization of the instantiation of the Good. 184 This
reasoned pursuit of the Good constitutes freedom, but does not coincide with happiness,
necessarily.
There has been much discussion of the question of why the philosopher should
return to the cave if it is less pleasurable for him than simply contemplating the forms. 185
I submit that Plato‘s philosophy of freedom offers a new approach to this question.
Framing the issue in terms of the ethical freedom of the philosopher clarifies Plato‘s
views. As I have shown, Plato does not view freedom as the ability to pursue any and all
of one‘s desires unhindered. This is true even for the fully enlightened philosopher,
whose desires one would imagine are the best a human being can have. 186 Instead, this
freedom is an ethical concept that is characterized by the pursuit, knowledge, and desire
to instantiate the Good. Thus, once he is released from the bonds of his prison-world and
sees Reality, the philosopher is not able to remain in perpetual contemplation of the
Forms, even though he finds this activity most pleasing. Rather, he is compelled to return
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to the cave-existence, albeit with a new, philosophical outlook, buoyed by his knowledge
of the Forms.
The philosopher‘s understanding of the Good itself compels him back to the
human community to share his knowledge and to shape the city and its people in the
human form of the Good.187 Thus, the compulsion experienced through Platonic freedom
derives from the logical necessity and ethical normativity of carrying out the Good.
Socrates says that the enlightened prisoner will not object to being ordered to return to
the cave because a just person will always obey just orders (520e). Thus, the compelling
force may be his own reason, as well as the Good itself, creating both internal and
external compulsion.188 For although the study of the Forms is most pleasing to the
philosopher, her reasoning and the Good itself requires her to return to the cave. Ethics
and logic trump pleasure for the enlightened philosopher.
We must look to the ethical component of the philosopher‘s freedom, in
particular, to understand why the philosopher does return to the cave. Although the
philosopher may have other strong desires, namely to contemplate the Forms, she is free
only when following reason‘s desires for the Good. The pursuit of all other competing
desires, if they are not in service of the Good, constitutes a lack of freedom. These
alternative desires cannot offer the stable, logical consistency of acting for the Good that
characterizes the philosopher. For the philosopher to stay contemplating the Forms would
be for her to act in line with pleasure as her highest value, not the Good. As we saw with
187
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the democrat and the tyrant, pursuing pleasure alone will lead to the strengthening of the
lower soul, which leads one away from the autonomous self-rule that philosophical
freedom gives. Further, it is questionable whether a philosopher who has seen the Good is
capable of making the choice to stay contemplating the Forms. For that would not be part
of the character of someone who had reached this level of philosophical ascent.
The contrast between slavery and freedom in the parable of the cave suggests that
there are two paths for a human being to take: either one remains ignorant or one seeks
the Good.189 An individual is always heading towards one direction or the other.
Whichever goal one‘s activity is directed towards is one‘s slave-master, in a sense. For
even the philosopher is unwilling, initially, to pursue the Good. She requires some form
of compulsion to progress towards it. Since the Good in Plato‘s metaphysical scheme is
absolute and unchanging, becoming dedicated to it is almost another form of enslavement
of the soul, perhaps better characterized as devotion. The philosopher‘s life is not her
own, but rather she willingly turns it over to the pursuit of and instantiation of the Good.
Silverman argues that once the philosopher has seen the Good, she cannot become
any happier or her soul more harmonious by more time spent contemplating the Forms. 190
He explains this concept as ―no backsliding.‖ If we take this to be true, then it also
applies to the philosopher‘s freedom, which is intimately connected to her sight of the
Good and her harmoniously-ordered soul. Thus, once the philosopher is fully free, she
will not slip back into unfreedom. Hence, the return to the cave will not pose a danger to
her freedom. Once free, always free. However, the distinct stages that the philosopher
189
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passes through in the myth suggest that the philosopher may attain partial freedom before
the final vision of the Good that enables a level of ultimate freedom. 191
b. Chariots of Freedom: Reason‟s Struggle in the Phaedrus
The Phaedrus myth, at 246a-257a, illuminates Plato‘s concept of freedom by
focusing on the struggles inherent in the tripartite psychology. Throughout the myth, each
soul part is shown to have divergent drives and motivations. Yet, at the same time, the
soul functions as a single unit. Do each of these parts have their own form of freedom?
What is the true form of freedom that Plato wishes to endorse? I will argue that Plato‘s
illustration of reason‘s battle to rule the soul underscores a rationally-focused theory of
freedom. The myth also reveals the omnipresence of the reasoning part throughout the
entire soul, even in cases where the other soul parts are said to rule the soul. Reason is
shown to be the sole agent of the soul.
i.

The Struggles of the Disembodied Soul

The myth is preceded by an argument for the immortality of the soul which
defines soul as self-moving (245e).192 This attribution establishes the soul as an
autonomous self-ruler and introduces the more detailed mythic exposition of
psychological freedom.193 The argument for immortality of the soul carries over into the
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theme of the subsequent myth, which illustrates the struggles of the soul both in life and
in the afterlife. 194
The myth begins with a comparison of the tripartite soul to a charioteer driving a
team of two winged horses, one beautiful and good, the other wild and difficult to
control. In the afterlife, the charioteer has an opportunity to view the Forms in ―the place
beyond heaven.‖ However, the bad horse can weigh the chariot back down towards
earth.195 This inhibits the charioteer‘s experience of the Forms and ―causes the most
extreme [ἔσχατος] toil and struggle that a soul will face‖ (247b6). Yet, this is a battle
that the charioteer can win through proper horse training and competent driving (247b,
248b). Thus, Plato‘s description suggests a causal relationship between the charioteer‘s
skill or efforts and his ability to view the Forms in the afterlife. Hence, a poorly trained
horse will restrict the soul‘s ability to become a philosopher. The bad horse is depicted as
a separate entity from the charioteer, but it is the charioteer who holds ultimate
responsibility for the bad horse‘s behavior. Plato depicts the horses and charioteer as
discrete, and perhaps ultimately separable entities, but their destinies are inextricably
linked while they are conjoined. 196
As the myth progresses, Plato shifts his emphasis away from the charioteer‘s
responsibility for events that he experiences towards contingency and luck as causes. 197
The myth now states that those who do not see the Forms could not keep up with the
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divine procession and ―by some accident‖ [συντυχίᾳ] take on a burden of forgetfulness
and wrongdoing (248c6-8). This results in those chariots being weighed down and
shedding their wings, falling to earth (248c-d).198 The emphasis on chance here may be
due to a more cosmic or impersonal perspective, rather than the more personal vantage
point of an individual soul.199 Erroneous actions can be viewed as accidental if reason is
recognized as the natural ruler of the soul. Cases where reason is not ruling the soul can
be characterized as the accidental malfunction of reason in an ignorant soul, much like an
illness can be seen as an unlucky occurrence. 200
Even though soul errors can be labeled accidental from a cosmic vantage point,
the charioteer still bears responsibility for his actions. For it is the charioteer‘s ability to
control his horses that determines his fate. The more he relinquishes control to appetite,
in particular, the further he slips away from the possibility of philosophical life. Yet, the
life controlled by appetite is rarely determined towards evil indefinitely. 201 Since the life
ruled by appetitive desires is not natural for human souls, there will always be the chance
that internal or external influences may alter the course of such a life in favor of
philosophy.
Further, Plato‘s scheme of transmigration of souls allows many chances for new
lives. After a thousand years of reward or retribution souls arrive at a ―choice and
allotment of second lives, and each soul chooses the life it wants [κλήρωσίν τε καὶ
198
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αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἱροῦνται ὃν ἂν θέλῃ ἑκάστη]‖ (249b2-4). The mention
of choice [αἵρεσις] twice in this sentence suggests a freedom, or lack of constraint, in the
souls‘ selection of next lives. However, the lottery [κλήρωσίν] alluded to has the same
effect of restricting the freedom here as it does in the Republic‘s myth of Er,202
suggesting divine involvement or an element of luck. 203 Additionally, Plato‘s description
of this system as following the law of destiny [θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας204 ὅδε] lends a
deterministic air to its workings, intermingled with the references to choice. In cases
where a soul chooses to reincarnate as an animal, transmigration is more deterministic
and less Platonically free. Here the desires of the lower soul dominate, limiting the
freedom of reason to follow its desires. Hence, the determinism involved seems to be a
causal determinism, whereby previous actions and current makeup of the soul determine
where souls end up in the next life. The real danger to human freedom is shown to be
overindulgence in the desires of the lower soul, which strengthens the lower soul and
hinders the soul‘s ability to see the Forms.
ii.

On Horses‟ Wings

The wings of the horses are a curious element of the myth. Though they are
attached to both the bad and good horse, they are also said to be akin to the divine, which
itself is beauty, wisdom and goodness. These virtues nourish the soul‘s wings, allowing
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the wings to grow in their presence. 205 The wings seem to allow the soul to remain aloft
in the afterlife to see the Forms, while they are shed when souls fall to earth and
reincarnate into a new body. Ficino associates the soul‘s freedom with the presence of its
wings. 206 This is a plausible symbolic association because the growth of the wings
corresponds to philosophical growth attendant to true Platonic freedom. I take it that the
sprouted wings on the good and bad horses keep the entire soul balanced and allow it to
see the Forms. The wings overcome the heaviness of the bad horse that otherwise causes
the soul to fall towards earth. Perhaps Plato intends a combination of both situations. In
either case, the wings allow the soul the freedom to follow the desire of the charioteer for
the Forms. The flexibility of the wings allows the soul to be measured and in control,
ready to go where the charioteer leads. When the charioteer controls the response of the
bad horse to Beauty, as depicted at the end of the myth, both horses sprout wings (255d12) and allow Reason to pursue the Forms.207
Strangely, Plato says that the entire soul had wings at one time (251b). Thus, the
philosophical lover sprouts wings beneath every part of his soul. Yet, if we try to
synchronize this point with the image of the charioteer and two horses, this results in the
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charioteer having the potential to grow wings too.208 This aligns with Plato‘s description
of the wings as being nourished by and akin to the Forms (246e1, 248c1-3). For of all the
parts of the soul, Reason most fits this description of being similar in nature to the divine
Forms. Hence, Reason should be most ―nourished‖ by experiencing the Forms.
The fact that the horses and the charioteer all sprout wings illustrates the unity of
the harmonious soul. I submit that the sprouting of wings, which are ‗akin to the divine‘,
on all three soul-parts is evidence that reason is active in all three soul parts. It is
significant that all three parts are uplifted by the same type of object—wings—even
though the horses are much inferior to the charioteer. The wings on the horses can be
seen to represent reason‘s mastery of the lower soul parts.209 For now spirit and appetite
are fused to the will of reason and must follow its lead. This interpretation corresponds
well with the mythical account of the embodied soul‘s encounter with the beauty of his
beloved, which I will discuss next.
iii.

The Struggles of the Embodied Soul

Just as the bad horse can impede the charioteer‘s vision of the Forms in the
afterlife, the lower soul can wreak havoc for the embodied soul. However, Plato depicts
an odd role reversal between the reasoning element and the lower soul. The charioteer
and the bad horse both use methods characteristic of the other when trying to get the
other to act a certain way. 210 The charioteer resorts to violence to make the bad horse
submit to the correct course of action, while earlier the bad horse uses persuasion and
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reasoning to try to bring the trio forward to proposition the boy. 211 As with the
description of the wings, this role reversal may be highlighting the unity of the soul to
show that in some sense the charioteer is the bad horse, and the bad horse is the
charioteer. I see the above role reversals of the bad horse and charioteer as pointing to the
unity of the soul under the reasoning part‘s agency. Thus, the charioteer should be
recognized as a symbol of the reasoning faculty, as well as the ideal person potentially
separable from the lower parts of the soul. Hence, each of the three parts of the soul
symbolized in the myth is not an agent independent from the whole. 212 Indeed, when the
chariot image is first introduced, Plato specifies that the three components together
represent a single soul (246a6-7).
The description of divine chariots in the myth provides further evidence for this
interpretation. Plato is surely presenting the divine chariots as divine paradigms of the
human soul, given that the divine and human chariots are depicted with similar
configurations. The myth presents the gods as charioteers separable from the horses and
the charioteer represents the essential nature of each god depicted. 213 Thus, we must
likewise see the human charioteer as the soul‘s essential nature, also perhaps at some
point separable from the horses, or spirit and appetite. 214 Yet, until souls are fully
purified through philosophy, they remain tripartite even in the afterlife, as represented by
the horses and charioteer. Therefore, we see some references to souls having lower
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desires in the eschatological myths of the Phaedo (81b1-c4), Gorgias (524d1-525a9) and
Republic (618e3-619a2).
However, if this is Plato‘s intention, then why do the divine chariots in the myth
have horses at all? Does this mean that their souls are tripartite, and even imperfect?
Ferrari takes the divine chariots to indicate ―not the simple unity of pure reason but the
perfect harmony of its parts.‖215 Yet, he goes on to say that the divine charioteer equates
to the god.216 This results in a confused picture of divine souls. A more promising
approach is to employ the concept of contingency central to the myth and apply it to the
depiction of the gods. If we take the divine charioteers as the gods themselves, their
horses become extensions of their wills, 217 or even simply tools with which the gods
perfectly achieve their goals.218 Perhaps the horses are needed for divine interaction with
human souls, but are otherwise disposable. If the divine chariots are to be models for
humans, then we can see the myth as advocating the installation of the charioteer‘s
desires as the driver of his life. At the same time, the soul‘s desires must be maintained in
their proper stations. The human soul‘s goal should be to use the lower parts of the soul
as tools to achieve reason‘s desires while it is saddled with physical embodiment.
However, the reasoning part remains the natural ruler of the soul.
Indeed, the appetitive and spirited parts cannot function without the aid of the
reasoning faculty. 219 The non-reasoning parts, by their very description, do not reason
and so must not have cognition. Thus, cognitive capacity belongs to the reasoning part of
215
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the soul alone.220 Deliberation is the sole province of the reasoning part. How do the
non-reasoning parts come to rule the soul in certain cases then? Neither the spirited nor
the appetitive parts of the soul are able to rule the soul independently. 221 There is always
a charioteer. Reason is always active, even when the desires of these other parts drive the
soul‘s actions. In the latter cases, the reasoning part becomes complicit to the desires of
appetitive or spirited parts.222 In this way, reason persuades itself to allow another part‘s
desires to become the principle of the soul‘s action.223 When one of the other two soul
parts is said to be in control of the soul, reason is still active in that it has formulated
beliefs in service of the desires of the non-rational soul parts. However, the principle of
action is the desire of either appetite or spirit. The rational part has chosen to serve the
desires of another part. This is a malfunction of reason in that it has formed false beliefs.
Thus, taking reason as the essential, if only ideal, person, all of the soul‘s actions
occur with the consent of reason, whether they are in line with reason‘s native desires or
not. The message in the role reversal passage of the myth is that reason can charm itself
into following the soul‘s own base desires. 224 Thus reason must learn to guard itself
against the enticements of appetitive desires. For the soul is in peril if appetitive desires
drive the soul‘s actions exclusively. On the other hand, reason may have to resort to
extreme methods when appetite cannot be assuaged through rational persuasion. The
violence that the charioteer commits is a language that the bad horse responds to. 225 The
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bad horse ―just barely yields to horsewhip and goad combined‖ (253e). This indicates
that in some cases a stronger response may be necessary given the nature of the bad
horse. Violence may not be akin to reason‘s nature, but it is used as a last resort to
prevent the total takeover of the soul‘s direction by the bad horse‘s desires, an event that
would be detrimental to the soul‘s well-being. I take the violence of the myth to be
portraying what Plato views as a real, rather than purely symbolic, phenomenon 226 in that
the myth shows the severity with which one must manage the appetitive soul. However, it
is violence against oneself. For the appetitive soul is a part of the soul.
Although the charioteer is violent towards the black horse, this violence is
described as an involuntary response to the beauty of the beloved. 227 I interpret this
involuntariness as the compulsion felt in response to the Form of Beauty itself, the sight
of which may dictate certain actions. This compulsion is characteristic of Platonic
freedom, whereby one acts only in line with reason‘s desires as informed by its
knowledge of the Forms. Once the soul has understood the Forms, it is incapable of
action opposed to virtue.228 Hence, this concept of freedom is a more nuanced version of
the popular conception of freedom as unimpeded ability to do whatever one wishes. 229
With this scene, Plato illustrates that his version of freedom includes an element of
compulsion towards certain actions. However, this compulsion derives from the reasoned
activity of the philosopher who deliberates about the motivating principle of his life.
Thus, this form of compulsion is an enlightened version of the compulsion felt by the bad
ἀναπίπτω for the motion of the charioteer twice, which Ferrari translates as to ‗rear back‘, twice (254b8,
e2).
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horse in the myth.230 For the philosopher‘s reason acts in accord with the truth given by
the Forms. Appetitive compulsion lacks this grounding force. With repeated submission
to appetitive desires, the soul becomes unmoored by the obsessiveness of appetitive
desires and loses the direction of reason that for Plato makes one free. Thus, although
rational compulsion diminishes the attractions of self-destructive action, 231 Plato shows
that this is true freedom. This underscores the fact that philosophical freedom is aligning
one‘s will with the Good and the Forms, more generally. Just as the untrained bad horse
seeks compulsively to satisfy his desires, the philosopher is compelled to act virtuously
when he understands the nature of the Forms.
A second analogue to the philosopher‘s desire for the Forms is the lover‘s desire
for his beloved. The lover‘s soul is described at 252a2-b2:
It forgets mother and brothers and friends entirely and doesn‘t care at all if it loses
its wealth through neglect. And as for proper and decorous behavior, in which it
used to take pride, the soul despises the whole business. Why, it is even willing to
sleep like a slave anywhere, as near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to
get! That is because in addition to its reverence for the one who has such beauty,
the soul has discovered that the boy is the only doctor for all that terrible pain.
The description of the beloved as cure for pain exhibits the same devotion of the
philosopher enthralled with the Forms. 232 The knowledge of the Forms provides the cure
for the mortality of the human condition. Compare the above description of the lover to
230
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the account of philosophers in the Republic as ―unwilling to occupy themselves with
human affairs . . . their souls are always pressing upwards, eager to spend their time
above‖ (517c7-9), and the mention that the philosopher ―behaves awkwardly and appears
completely ridiculous if he‘s compelled, either in the courts or elsewhere, to contend
about the shadows of justice‖ (517d6-8).233 In the Republic, we also find a comparison of
erotically-inclined men to philosophers. 234 Eros underlies both the compulsion of the
philosopher for the Forms and the compulsion of the lover for his beloved.
A concept of freedom is invoked in the description of the philosophical lovers.
The myth states that if the lover and the boy give in to the better elements in both of their
minds, which lead them to follow the assigned regimen of philosophy, their life here
below is one of bliss and shared understanding. Remarkably, their situation is described
as both the freeing of the good part of the soul and the enslavement of the bad part:
―They are modest and fully in control of themselves [ἐγκρατεῖς αὑτῶν καί κόσμιοι]
now that they have enslaved [δουλωσάμενοι] the part that brought trouble into the soul
and set free [ἐλευθερώσαντες] the part that gave it virtue‖ (256b). Here we see selfcontrol incorporated into Plato‘s definition of freedom, along with continued mastery of
appetite and spirit. 235
Plato then contrasts the philosophically free life with the life of psychologicallydivided unphilosophical lovers:
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If, on the other hand, [the lovers] adopt a lower way of living, with ambition
[φιλοτίμῳ] in place of philosophy, then pretty soon when they are careless
[ἀμελείᾳ] because they have been drinking, or for some other reason, the pair‘s
undisciplined horses will catch their souls off guard [ἀφρούρους] and together
bring them to commit that act which ordinary people would take to be the
happiest choice of all; and when they have consummated it once, they go on
doing this for the rest of their lives, but sparingly, since they have not approved of
what they are doing with their whole minds [οὐ πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ
πράττοντες] (256b-c).
The life depicted is that of the timocratic man. This unphilosophical lover holds ambition
rather than love of wisdom as his goal, which places the desires of honor-loving spirit in
charge of his soul. Since reason is not in its rightful, natural place of ruling the soul, the
lovers will give in to their lust, though more sparingly than if appetite was ruling. The
lovers‘ actions are not whole-hearted, as the spirited part feels shame and the reasoning
part is opposed to the actions. From the description of the timocratic lover we can infer
that the philosophical lover acts with the approval of his whole mind, in harmony with
the entire soul. The descriptions of the timocratic soul, on the other hand, is a portrait of a
soul divided. Such divisiveness will always be present, and felt, in a soul not directed by
reason. By placing reason in the position of power in one‘s soul one can experience the
true freedom of harmoniously directing one‘s life activities towards instantiating virtue.
However, the spirited lover is closer to achieving true freedom than the soul driven by
appetite, in that he feels shame at participating in dishonorable acts.
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The portrayal of the lover ruled by appetite serves a different purpose than the
description of the timocratic lover. The appetitively-driven soul is representative of the
faulty freedom of the tyrant that Plato attacks with his doctrine of freedom. Plato says
that the lover ruled by the appetitive part ―sets out in the manner of a four-footed beast,
eager to make babies; [he makes licence (ὕβρει) his companion],236 he goes after
unnatural pleasure too, without a trace of fear or shame‖ (250e-251a). The comparison to
an animal is no doubt an intentional criticism of the tyrant‘s view of freedom as
hedonism, as well as perhaps a reference to the black horse.
Plato further describes the interaction between reason and the other two soul parts
as a contest between two types of principles:
. . . each of us is ruled by two principles which we follow whatever they lead: one
is our inborn desire for pleasures [ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν], the other is our acquired
judgment [ἐπίκτητος δόξα] that pursues what is best. Sometimes these two are
in agreement; but there are times when they quarrel inside us, and then
sometimes one of them gains control, sometimes the other. Now when judgment
[δόξης] is in control and leads us by reasoning [λόγῳ] toward what is best, that
sort of self-control is called ‗being in your right mind‘[σωφροσύνη]; but when
desire takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then
its command is known as ‗outrageousness‘[ὕβρις]. (237d-238a)
These two forces are also invoked in the Gorgias, where doing what one pleases or sees
fit to do [ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι] is distinguished from doing what one
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wants [βούλονται] (466e1-3).237 Thus, a fight for power in the soul ensues when the
pleasure-seeking element is at odds with the reasoning part.238 There is a back and forth
of power as one gains control, then the other. Although the idea of gratifying our
pleasurable desires at will appeals to the hedonistic element in the soul, by dissociating
this type of behavior from conscious, reasoned action, Plato shows that the life of
hedonism ultimately lacks continuity and direction that the reasoning part gives by
following its own desires. Hence, a person who lives a human life of hedonism will end
up as an animal in the next life 239 because he has essentially given up his use of that
distinctly human power of reasoning to simply float from pleasurable experience to
pleasurable experience without the anchor of the Good to give meaning and direction to
his life path.
Frankfurt offers the helpful distinction between free action and free will. 240 A free
action occurs when an individual is able to satisfy first-order desires he has. A first-order
desire takes the form of B wants C. A free will, on the other hand, necessitates a selfreflexive second-order (or higher-order) volition to have that first-(or lower-)order desire.
A second-order volition takes the form of B wants/does not want to want C. Frankfurt
argues that it is freedom of the will, not freedom of action, which constitutes a person.
Hence, Ferrari argues that the bad horse is akin to Frankfurt‘s ―wanton‖ who only has
first-order desires and does not reflect upon whether he wants such desires at a second
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order.241 However, Frankfurt does not preclude the wanton from being able to reason or
deliberate in order to achieve his desires. 242 Rather, he simply lacks the ability or
motivation to reflect upon his own desires. 243 This fits with my interpretation that for
Plato reason is active even in cases where the desires of the lower soul are driving
actions. The philosopher simply uses his reason to pursue the reasoning faculty‘s desires.
Frankfurt does not consider the wanton a person because he does not have a free
will with second-order desires. This raises the question of personhood within Plato‘s
theory of freedom. According to Plato, reason is the natural ruler of the soul. As such, we
might say that every human244 has a higher-order desire to have his first-order desires
coincide with the desires native to reason. However, in most instances, Plato thinks that
people have conflicting second-order desires or have an additional higher-order desire to
identify with the desires of the lower soul. Either scenario has the effective result of
having no second-order desire and thereby destroys an individual‘s personhood.245 To be
free, for Plato, is also to be a fully-formed person whose second-order volition is for the
desires of reason to drive one‘s actions, and to accomplish those actions. However, most
human beings are not free, by this definition, and hence are not persons. I have been
arguing all along that Plato‘s requirements for freedom are very stringent and pertain
only to relatively rare philosophers. Yet, the result that most human beings are not
persons seems to cast the net too narrowly. 246 Hence, it is instructive to use Gerson‘s
classifications of embodied and disembodied persons as different entities. To be a
241
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Platonic person, for Gerson, is to be a knower, ideally and to identify oneself completely
with one‘s rational part. However, one can only fully achieve this state as a disembodied
soul. Thus, embodied persons are by virtue of their embodiment, divided souls, never
fully able to identify with their rational soul parts due to the constant presence of desires
of the lower soul inherent to embodiment. 247 Therefore, we can allow for degrees of
personhood in Plato.248 Correspondingly, this suggests degrees of freedom in Platonic
thought, as well.
Returning to the image of the chariot, it is the horses, or lower parts of the soul,
that prevent the soul from getting a good view of Reality in the afterlife. 249 However, the
project of the philosopher is not to kill the horses, as evidenced by the presence of horses
in the chariots of the gods. In looking to this divine model, the aim is to turn the horses
into assets rather than liabilities. The growth of the horses‘ wings seems to reflect the fact
that when properly ordered the other parts of the soul can aid reason to pursue its goals,
namely to view the Forms. Thus appetite and spirit are not destroyed; however, the
desires of these parts simply do not form the basis of the philosopher‘s actions. 250 The
philosopher identifies with the second-order desire for reason‘s desires. The divine
chariots have two251 good horses instrumental to achieving the charioteer‘s goals. Their
chariots ―move easily since they are balanced [ἰσορρόπως] and well under control
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[εὐήνια]‖ (247b2). Humans must learn how to transform and maintain their horses to be
good horses.
However, as we saw with the difficulties of conferring Platonic personhood upon
embodied souls, it is almost impossible to achieve the state that the gods exhibit. Hence,
Ferrari takes the mastery of the contingency of our embodiment as the main point of the
myth.252 I agree with this general interpretation. The unpredictability associated with
matter253 ensures a certain level of contingency to be present as long as our souls are
embodied. Hence, the trick is to learn to be a master of oneself, including one‘s worse
and challenging elements. This is where true freedom comes from. For if one aims one‘s
actions firmly and consciously towards reason‘s desires, one is more likely to attain one‘s
goals in a predictable fashion. On the other hand, if one gives in to the demands of the
lower soul parts more than necessary these parts are shown to lead one to erratic and
unpredictable behavior. Although, in such cases, one may be doing what one pleases, it is
not what the reasoning part wants, ultimately. True freedom comes with the self-control
of the charioteer and his properly-trained horses that always support his goals, just as the
divine horses do.
Socrates reiterates this message with his prayer at the end of the dialogue:
O dear Pan254 and all the other gods of this place, grant that I may be beautiful
inside. Let all my eternal possessions be in friendly harmony [φίλια] with what is
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within. May I consider the wise man rich. As for gold, let me have as much as a
moderate man [ὁ σώφρων] could bear and carry with him. (279b8-c2)
The final message of the dialogue conveys a wish for proper ordering of the soul so that
reason‘s desires are heeded while the desires of the lower soul are moderated. Therefore,
the Phaedrus myth has shown freedom to be contingent upon reason‘s rule of spirit and
appetite so that it may act in line with its knowledge of the Forms. Once again this
freedom is not liberty to follow any desires that arise, but rather it is the self-controlled
rule of reason in the soul. The image of the puppet in the Laws will further bear this out.
c. Gripping the Golden Cord: the Freedom of Divine Reason in the Laws
Plato‘s description of the image of the puppeteer occupies only a short section in the
first book of the Laws.255 However, it presents a striking image of humans as puppets of
the gods and reveals a curious mixture of elements of both freedom and determinism.
Once the contrary elements present in this myth and its related passages are untangled, it
becomes evident that the myth reinforces the doctrine of Platonic freedom that I have
been arguing for throughout.
The puppet image is introduced in the following passage:
. . . let‘s imagine that each of us living beings is a puppet of the gods. Whether we
have been constructed to serve as their plaything, or for some serious reason, is
beyond our ken, but what we certainly do know is this: we have these emotions
in us, which act like cords or strings and tug us about; they work in opposition,
and tug against each other to make us perform actions that are opposed
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correspondingly; back and forth we go across the boundary line where vice and
virtue meet. One of these dragging forces according to our judgment demands our
constant obedience, and this is the one we have to hang on to, come what may;
the pull of the other cords we must resist. The cord, which is golden and holy,
transmits the power of ―calculation‖, a power which in a state is called the public
law; being golden, it is pliant, while the others, whose composition resembles a
variety of other substances, are tough and inflexible. The force exerted by law is
excellent and one should always cooperate with it, because although ‗calculation‘
is a noble thing, it is gentle, not violent, and its efforts need assistants, so that the
gold in us may prevail over the other substances. (Laws 644d 7–645a8)
In this section I will focus on the particular mythical image presented in this passage as
well as two passages of the Laws where Plato returns to the puppet image and the related
themes of freedom and determinism. However, first I will examine the allusions to other
poetic works that Plato may be drawing upon with the puppet image.
i.

Poetic Allusions in the Myth

Elements within the golden cord passage bear similarities to Homer and Hesiod.
In Book VIII in Homer‘s Iliad, Zeus dares the other gods and goddesses to attempt to pull
him down from the sky. 256 Instead, Zeus brags that he could drag them all up with the
earth and sea, as the victor in a divine tug of war. The image of the gods pulling a cord is
similar to the one evoked by Plato in the Laws. Additionally, Hesiod‘s myth of the five
ages in Works and Days257 may be a source for Plato‘s symbolism of the various metals
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making up the cords.258 The golden cord is the finest and best for Plato, just as the
golden race is the best in Hesiod. Plato may be suggesting that clinging to the golden
cord will give rise to an existence similar to the golden race. The golden cord may also
represent this race which is now said to be daimónia of men. In the latter case, by
gripping the golden cord humans are tapping into the goodness of these intermediary
‗pure spirits‘ who are loved by the gods. In Hesiod, the other lesser cords that Plato
describes as made of various substances evoke the subsequent inferior four ages of man,
represented by the lesser metals silver, bronze 259 and iron. Hesiod places man in the fifth,
iron age.260 This age is characterized by suffering, though Hesiod says that they ―have
some good mingled with their evils‖ (175). Plato, too, has this view of humans as he
demonstrates with his tripartite psychology which distinguishes one elevated part of the
soul and two baser parts. This psychology is echoed in Plato‘s myth in the variegation of
the metals, with the golden cord being associated with divine reason in contrast to the
―tough and inflexible‖ cords representing the emotions.
Finally, in the Republic, the myth of the cave mentions puppets and puppeteers as
an analogy: ―Imagine that along this path a low wall has been built, like the screen in
front of puppeteers [θαυματοποιοῖς] above which they show their puppets [θαύματα]‖
(514b2-4). In front of the wall people pass carrying statues of people and animals,
creating a kind of shadow puppet show with the fire behind them. This stage of the cave

258

Plato avails himself of the Hesiodic theme of the metals in some of his own works prior to the Laws. In
the Republic, the myth of the metals (415a-c) claims that each stratum of society is suffused by a metal,
namely, gold, silver, bronze or iron. Those with gold in them are the most valuable and most equipped to
rule. Likewise, in the Statesman the kingly class is associated with gold (303d-e). The Statesman myth
(268d-274e) likewise employs a categorization of cosmic ages similar to the Hesiodic ages of man.
259
There are two brazen, or bronze, generations. The first self-destructs, while the second comprises the
Heroic Age of Troy.
260
169-200.

114
myth is suggestive of imagination and belief. 261 The world of the puppets is inferior to
the world of the Forms outside the cave. We shall see whether this ascription translates to
the puppet of the Laws. However, it is striking that the only other place that Plato
mentions puppets [θαῦμα] is another myth about being freed from the bondage of
ignorance. 262 The Laws expands upon this image presented fleetingly in the Republic.
ii.

Analysis of the Puppeteer Passage

Just prior to the myth, the group of interlocutors is discussing moral education.
The Athenian Stranger tells the puppeteer myth to Cleinias and Megillus in order to
illustrate the problem of psychic forces operating on individuals and to recommend an
avenue for self-control. Thus, again263 freedom is associated with self-control. The myth
begins with the suggestion that humans are puppets [θαῦμα] of the gods. Plato uses the
word θεῖον, which can be interpreted in one sense as a substantive in the genitive,
rendering the phrase ‗puppets of the gods.‘ Alternatively, θεῖον can be taken as
adjectival, meaning that humans partake in the divine, and thus are serious beings after
all. 264 The Stranger plays up this ambiguity by suggesting that the question of the exact
purpose that humans serve for the gods be put aside, whether it is a serious purpose or not
(644d9-e1).
On the first reading, this puppet image gives a deterministic picture of human life.
Typically, a puppet is controlled completely by the puppeteer who jerks the cords to
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produce the desired reactions in the puppet. However, a toy or puppet can also be seen as
an imitation of something real. In this case, the puppet is a likeness of a human. The
imitative aspect of the puppet image invokes Plato‘s discussions of mimesis in the
Republic.265 Plato uses this image to call us to be more than simple puppets living an
illusory, unreal existence. He is trying to persuade us to acknowledge the native
rationality within us and to take charge of aligning our lives with reason. By invoking the
unreal existence of the puppet, Plato hints at the possibility and reality of freedom. The
mimetic aspect of the puppet image also applies to the larger scale in reminding the
reader that, just as a shadow puppet is an imitation of a human, the city of the Laws is an
imitation of the best city, which is a city of gods.266 Thus, the legislation of the city is an
imitation of the grand cosmic order.267 The mimetic aspect of the puppet image is a
reminder that both individuals and cities are imitators of the divine order of the cosmos.
In the next few lines of the myth, the manipulating force shifts from being the
gods to becoming our own emotions:
we have these emotions [πάθη] in us, which act like cords or strings and tug us
about; they work in opposition, and tug against each other to make us perform
actions that are opposed correspondingly; back and forth we go across the
boundary line where vice and virtue meet. (644e1-5)
By substituting human emotions for the gods as the drivers of our actions, the image
becomes less deterministic because the driving forces of human action have become
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internalized rather than being imposed divinely from without. Clearly the image of the
gods directing one‘s actions as puppet masters is deterministic. However, if the
controlling forces are within a person, it is more difficult to label the situation one of
straight determinism. 268
What role do emotions play in constituting the individual identity and will? Here
Plato is distinguishing emotions from the self and the will by describing actions driven by
emotions as involuntary, even though they are states internal to the person and constitute
a part of the soul.269 Emotions [πάθη] force us to act in certain ways, seemingly against
our own will. Yet, Plato does not want to go as far as saying that emotions determine our
actions entirely. He distinguishes the force of emotions from the puppeteer gods and
rationality by likening the emotions to cords, rather than puppet masters. This leaves
open the identity of the pullers of the emotion-cords. Even though the focus has shifted
from external puppet masters to internal forces driving human action, the change
continues to give a somewhat deterministic picture of life as a struggle between opposing
internal influences that drag the ‗puppet‘ self from action to action, seemingly
irrespective of, and distinct from, her own will. In this scenario, the human puppet is not
acting in accordance with her true will. Rather, she is like a passive rope in a tug of war
of emotions.
In the continuation of the myth Plato further mitigates the initial externally-based
determinism of the image. The passage continues:
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One of these dragging forces according to our judgement demands our constant
obedience, and this is the one we have to hang on to, come what may; the pull of
the other cords we must resist. This cord, which is golden and holy, transmits the
power of ―calculation‖ [τοῦ λογισμοῦ]. (644e5-645a3)
These lines introduce a concept of freedom. We are being directed to hang onto the
golden cord and to resist the pull of the lesser cords, suggesting that we do have the
liberty to choose the forces that direct our actions. Plato implies that only those who
choose to hold onto the golden cord are truly free because they are acting with divine
rationality, while those who do not make this choice are led by their emotions like
puppets. The action of gripping the golden cord changes the image from one of a puppet
to a person who has the ability to control her life and actions.
The golden and holy cord is said to be the transmitter [ἀγωγήν] of the power of
calculation. The word ἀγωγήν has senses of guiding, leading, and even educating or
training, 270 while calculation is defined by the Athenian as the faculty ―by which we
judge the relative merits of pleasure and pain‖ (644d2-3). As such, by hanging onto the
golden cord we become more rational and more virtuous, in that our judgements about
the best way of life are fostered. What does this golden cord itself represent? A more
straightforward interpretation is that the cord represents the rational part of the soul in
battle with the other parts of the soul for dominion over our actions. 271 Hence, the golden
cord is the highest, rational part of the soul, while the other cords represent its lower
parts. The puppet signifies the personal identity which is besieged by many competing
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drives trying to take hold in the soul. Whichever cord, or cords, are gripped by the puppet
determine his identity. By beseeching us to grip onto the golden cord Plato is urging us to
take control of our destinies, and ourselves, by choosing to have rationality govern our
conduct. This will promote independence from the limitations of puppet life. For if the
rational part does not rule, we are condemned to live a life dominated by our emotions.
The Athenian confirms this interpretation when he states that the moral of the fable for
the individual is that he ―must grasp272 [λαβόντα] the truth about these forces that pull
him, and act on it in his life‖ (645b5-6). Plato constructs the myth so as to make the life
of emotion sound deterministic in contrast to the freedom of choosing the path of
rationality. Thus, the first step towards freedom is to understand the emotions acting
within one‘s soul. The second step is to counteract their influences by cultivating
rationality resolutely. The emotional forces in the lower soul must be understood so that
they may be resisted and oriented towards helping the highest soul act in alignment with
the good.
This interpretation of the cords as parts of the soul accounts for one level of
meaning in the myth, but it does not account for the puppet imagery fully. Although the
metaphor works easily when the opposing forces are all internal, with the parts of the soul
competing with one another as puppet masters. We must not forget that the myth is
introduced with the gods as puppet masters, a very deterministic image. Do these two
senses of the puppet master as god and as individual soul part cohere? Recognizing the
cord as part of the puppet is important for solving the puzzle. Although the cord is a
distinct element, in the case of a puppet the cord can be considered a part of the puppet
272
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too. By deciding to go along with the golden cord, the puppet identifies himself with the
cord. In this way, too, he identifies with the will of the gods. Hence, the determinism
dissipates because the individual‘s will becomes part of the greater divine will. Since the
puppet chooses to grip the golden cord, he is free even if the source of his actions
emanates from elsewhere. Plato‘s shift towards speaking of the ―gold in us‖ (645a8),
confirms the human kinship with the divine and the possibility of freedom.
The golden cord itself is described as holy or divine [ἱεράν], an attribution not
used in the description of the other cords, which he says are composed of various harder,
less valuable metals. This distinction indicates that only the golden cord is linked to the
gods, obscuring the identity of the puppet master, if there is one, who is pulling the lesser
cords representing emotions. Indeed, Plato suggests that allowing the lesser cords to drive
one‘s actions is to act aimlessly, with no direction at all, as he indicates in his description
of the pull of the cords: ―they work in opposition, and tug against each other to make us
perform actions that are opposed correspondingly; back and forth we go across the
boundary line where vice and virtue meet‖ (644e3-5). Here the subject is depicted as a
true puppet, being jerked back and forth from action to action, with no self-control. This
spontaneous action sounds more like radical indeterminism273 rather than determinism
because there is no rational singleness of purpose, but rather a succession of spontaneous
actions.
By recognizing the superior constitution of the golden cord and by acting in
accordance with it, we do remain puppets, and in fact truer puppets than those who are
led erratically by their passions. The puppet master holding the golden cord provides
273
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rational and consistent direction in life, unlike the inferior cords jerking people about
every which way following a series of emotional whims. The puppet gripping the golden
cord is fusing her will with the will of the puppet master gods, thereby transitioning from
puppet towards master of herself and possibly even divinity. Therefore, the Athenian says
that the myth clarifies ―the meaning of the terms ‗self-superior‘ and ‗self-inferior‘
[κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἥττω]‖ (645b2-3). By identifying with the best, rational part of
one‘s soul, which is linked to the divine, one achieves self-determination and freedom.
With this inversion, Plato transforms the idea of puppethood into a desirable condition in
which the puppet consents to her position and her direction by the golden cord. Hence,
the best puppets are the truly free.
The version of freedom that Plato presents is not the usual contemporary
conception of freedom as simply being able to act according to one‘s desires.274
According to Platonic freedom, one is free when acting rationally in line with the desires
of the higher good. This freedom is almost another form of determinism in that one is
aiming to habitually adhere to the rational course of action at all times, rendering one‘s
choices predictable. 275 The gripping is really a letting go of all other competing passions.
We have a choice about who our puppet master is; we can either be ruled by emotion or
by divine reason. The choice is between being a rational or irrational puppet. In fact,
there is only one choice to be made—the choice of rationality. For the alternative of
being led by one‘s emotions is not a choice at all, rather it is the state that one remains in
until the choice of rationality is made. The person being led by her emotions is shown to
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have many incompatible masters ordering her about. She cannot be considered free
because she is not acting with a single unified will. Yet, when she grips the golden cord,
the pulls of the emotion-cords continue to exert their force on the soul. However, the
more closely she aligns with reason, the less of an impact the lesser cords will have.
iii.

Related Passages in the Laws

In Book 7 of the Laws, the Stranger returns to the theme of the human as a
plaything [παίγνιον] for God.276 The Stranger says that this feature of being a divine
plaything is the best aspect of man. As such, ―every man and every woman should play
this part and order their whole life accordingly, engaging in the best possible pastimes—
in quite a different frame of mind than their present one‖ (803c5-8). Here the Stranger
challenges the typical view that the end goal of serious work is leisure by observing that
the consequences of warfare, for instance, are never real leisure or true education, which
is the most important activity. Peacetime is more congenial to these activities. Thus, a
man should spend his whole life at play ―sacrificing, singing, dancing—so that he can
win the favor of the gods and protect himself from his enemies and conquer them in
battle‖ (803e1-3). Since men are now said to be toys of the gods, play and pleasing one‘s
master are the most appropriate activities for a toy. This instruction to be the best toy one
can be is in keeping with my interpretation of the puppet passage. Just as with the puppet
image, Plato inverts the usual sense of toy as an inanimate and determined possession
into a being capable of rational choice, namely the choice to accept his role as a toy
completely and to fulfill it as best he can. Again, Plato incorporates a conception of
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freedom into his account with his emphasis on choice; but the choice remains between
two deterministic existences. Either one accepts the assigned role of divine toy and acts
in harmony with the rational cosmic order or one lets irrational mortal passions drive
one‘s actions toward harmful activities without any direction other than hedonism. The
former choice allows one a share in divinity, although it is only a share, as the Stranger
says that humans are ―puppets . . . mostly, and hardly real at all‖ (804b3-4). This allusion
to the puppeteer myth ties the two images of toy and puppet together, fittingly, since a
puppet is simply a toy with strings. Freedom is achieved with the choice to accept one‘s
position. By assuming the puppet role wholeheartedly the puppet can have a share in
divinity and reality. The puppet must accept reason as the natural ruler of his soul. All
other soul arrangements threaten his freedom.
The freedom that comes with acceptance of the puppet role seems to be part of a
continuum, in that the more perfectly one plays one‘s role, for example by worshipping
the appropriate divinities at the appropriate times, the more good will one engenders from
the gods. Having the good will of the gods allows men to ―live the life that their own
nature demands‖ (804b3), making them better puppets of the gods and extensions of
divine will. In doing so, the best puppets are fusing their wills with the divine will, in
essence becoming more like the gods. However, just as with the myth of the cave, there is
an initial gripping of the cord that represents a sudden event, like the prisoner‘s release
from his bonds. Thus, although one can be more or less free by degrees, Plato suggests an
uneven transition toward freedom, as was seen with the cave allegory.
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In Book 10, the theme of divine intervention is capped with a discussion of the
scope of God‘s interference in men‘s affairs. Plato states that God is involved in the
minutest of details of the universe:
The supervisor of the universe has arranged everything with an eye to its
preservation and excellence, and its individual parts play appropriate active
[ποιεῖ] or passive [πάσχει] roles according to their various capacities. These
parts, down to the smallest details of their active [πράξεως] and passive [πάθης]
functions, have each been put under the control of ruling powers that have
perfected the minutest constituents of the universe. (903b5-10)
This description of God‘s relationship to the universe sounds like a form of theological
determinism, which is the thesis that God causes all events, including human actions,
thereby preventing human freedom. However, the distinction between active and passive
roles may be Plato‘s way of acknowledging the special human brand of freedom which
allows for choice in determining one‘s actions, even if those actions are consistent with
God‘s will. Still, human actions are a cog in the machinery of the whole universe, which
is driving continually towards the good. Is one truly free in a paternalistic universe in
which good is always victorious? The Athenian tells a hypothetical detractor of the view
that gods show concern for humans, ―you exist for the sake of the universe‖ (903c5-6),
informing him ―your position is best not only for the universe but for you too, thanks to
your common origin‖ (903d2-3). In this way Plato cleverly circumvents the question of
determinism by focusing on the assimilation of the human will to the purely rational
divine will. The Good is the good for all. This response mitigates the deterministic
aspects of the universe‘s design by emphasizing the connectedness of humans to the
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universe and its originator. If one allies oneself with God‘s will, one is not being
determined by external forces. Instead, one is becoming one‘s own master.
In order to explain the interconnectedness of living beings with the divine more
fully, Plato embarks on a discussion of transmigration of the soul:
since a soul is allied with different bodies at different times, and perpetually
undergoes all sorts of changes, either self-imposed or produced by some other
soul, the divine checkers-player [τῷ πεττευτῇ] has nothing to do except promote
a soul with a promising character to a better situation, and relegate one that is
deteriorating to an inferior, as is appropriate in each case, so that they all meet the
fate they deserve. (903d-e)
This brief excursus into eschatology broadens the theme of play, this time comparing
humans to chess pieces. Even with this deterministic analogy Plato ensures that we
realize that we, as chess pieces, are still morally responsible for the states we are in by
mentioning self-imposed change and the legal notion of desert. Soul changes are said to
be either self-imposed or produced by some other soul, presumably one whose company
we have chosen to keep. This is in keeping with the theme of self-control and conquest of
oneself that runs through the Laws. 277 Thus, the divine checkers player is merely
directing souls to their appropriate stations, given their life choices. Once more, upon
closer examination, the deterministic language that Plato uses cloaks a concept of
freedom of the will in deciding one‘s life path. This final image portrays God as
powerless to change the earned destiny of each soul and shifts the power back to the
individual, again, suggesting the possibility of human freedom.
277
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The Laws begins with the statement that law has a divine, not human, origin. 278
Initially, such a providential arrangement seems to put human free will into question.
However, throughout the Laws, Plato emphasizes his own version of human freedom
which is attainable by each individual within the ordered cosmic framework. By
continually applying deterministic metaphors for humans such as toys, puppets and chess
pieces, Plato is underscoring the interconnectedness of all beings in the universe,
particularly the human connection to the divine. Everything in the universe originates
from the divine and humans retain a link to the divine source via the rational, best part of
their souls. At the same time, Plato holds humans morally responsible for their actions,
individually, which explains why he emphasizes choice repeatedly. Choice is guided by
the state of the soul. The more one allows the highest rational soul to rule, the more
rationally one acts and the freer one is in the sense of being in control of oneself. If, on
the other hand, the lower soul is allowed to rule one‘s actions through hedonism and
pain-avoidance, then one is closer to a state of spontaneous indeterminism whereby true
rational choice does not exist. By urging us to grip the golden cord, Plato is advising us to
acknowledge our divine source. It is only when we merge our identities with the highest
divine soul that we become free masters of ourselves. Thus, true freedom is becoming
like a god. In contemporary terms, Plato could be labeled a compatibilist because he
recognizes human freedom of choice to align one‘s will with the divine will, which is at
the same time directing the universe providentially towards the good. Since this choice is
not constrained, it is free. However, Plato thinks that it is the only moral choice to make,
rendering Platonic freedom a fundamentally ethical concept.
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5. Conclusion
Plato‘s concept of freedom has been shown to be an answer to the challenges of
competing concepts of freedom, namely conventional freedom, democratic freedom, and
tyrannical freedom. Plato employs the ethical foundation of conventional freedom as well
as its focus on restraining the appetite in his own concept of freedom. However, he also
requires grounding in knowledge of the Good, not merely obedience to its laws. Plato
criticizes democracy for its own faulty version of freedom, which lacks both the
knowledge and normativity of the Good. He likens democratic freedom to wine, as it
must be moderated by reason. The equality of all citizens, Plato thinks, will lead to the
erosion of social mores and will encourage the city to be driven by the lowest desires of
the souls of the majority of citizens. Ultimately, he says that the amorality and anarchy of
democracy leads to tyranny. The tyrant, too, holds a false conception of freedom, this
time as the ability to follow any desire unhindered. Plato shows that, once again, the
amorality of this freedom actually enslaves the entire soul to the worst, most vicious
lower parts of the soul. Tyranny is first broached in the Gorgias and with the thought
experiment of Gyges‘ ring in the Republic. Hence, the topic of freedom pervades the
Platonic corpus.
At the end of the Republic Plato answers the challenge to show that the just man
fares best. The myth of Er shows that ―virtue knows no master‖, or that the soul is most
free when operating in line with reason‘s desire for the Good. However, even souls with
diminished capacities for philosophical freedom are shown to be responsible for their
choices. The depictions of souls in the afterlife suggest that the lower parts of the soul
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can survive physical death so that they are present in the afterlife. Philosophers may
ultimately achieve permanent liberation from the lower soul after a certain number of life
cycles.
The first part of chapter four uncovered the philosopher‘s route to freedom
through education. Philosophers are to be educated specifically to be free so that they
may create and maintain the city‘s freedom. Slavishness and lawlessness threaten the
goal of free ruling philosophers. I speculated that freedom may be a Platonic Form but
not a virtue. However, freedom is necessary for virtue. The cave allegory depicts the
educational pursuit of the Good in mythical form as a liberation tale. However, I argued
that this theme of liberation points explicitly to a more stringent philosophical concept of
individual metaphysical freedom. I believe that the rational part of the soul may be one of
the compelling forces, along with the Good itself, that leads the philosopher out of the
cave. The compulsion exerted within Platonic freedom derives from the logical necessity
and ethical normativity of carrying out the Good. The Republic highlights the Form of the
Good, and emphasizes knowledge of the Forms more generally, as the ideals which
should inform free actions. The myth of the cave shows the process of understanding the
Forms as freedom from the enslavement of imagination and belief. At the same time, this
freedom entails an absolute allegiance to the Forms and necessitates action to instantiate
them on earth. The myth of the cave underscores the idea, seen in Plato‘s critique of
democratic freedom, that philosophical freedom is not liberty to pursue desires
uninhibited.
The second portion of chapter four examines two other myths. The Phaedrus
myth provides further detail about the interaction between the parts of the soul. It
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emphasizes the natural position of reason as ruler of the soul. Spirit and appetite can help
reason to achieve its goals in the best scenario but if reason becomes complacent, appetite
or spirit may come to drive the soul‘s actions by enslaving reason for its purposes.
Although outside forces may affect the soul, the soul is shown to be responsible for its
own activity. The passages of the Laws fill in the account of freedom already set forth in
the Republic and the Phaedrus. The image of the golden cord in the Laws gives us more
information about the soul‘s relationship to reason. Action of the soul in line with reason
puts an individual in the most control over her life, allowing her to be free in Plato‘s
understanding of freedom. The divinity of reason links the philosopher to the gods, so
that she is working to instantiate the Good that the cosmos is driving towards. The
alternative is enslavement to emotion, which will lead to erratic and unpredictable action.
The freedom of the philosopher is moderate, self-controlled and predictable.
Therefore, I have shown that Plato has a consistent concept of freedom evident in
his corpus. This ethical concept of philosophical freedom bears further consideration in
the contemporary free will debate, which might rightly be said to be ―a series of footnotes
to Plato.‖279
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